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ABSTRACT
Racially polarized voting makes minorities more vulnerable to
discriminatory changes in election laws and therefore implicates nearly
every voting rights doctrine. In Thornburg v. Gingles, the Supreme
Court held that racially polarized voting is a necessary—but not a
sufficient—condition for a vote dilution claim under Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act. The Court, however, has recently questioned the
propriety of recognizing the existence of racially polarized voting. This
colorblind approach threatens not only the Gingles factors but also
Section 2’s constitutionality.
The Court treats racially polarized voting as a modern
phenomenon. But the relevant starting point is the 1860s, not the 1960s.
Prior to the Fifteenth Amendment’s passage, Republicans received
overwhelming support from newly enfranchised Black voters in the
former Confederate States and expected that support to continue. The
Reconstruction Framers were thus attentive to the realities of racially
polarized voting and openly recognized that extending the franchise
would empower Black voters to mobilize politically and protect their
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own interests. Racially polarized voting was a feature—not a bug—in
the passage and ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment. Accordingly,
this Article argues that the Court’s treatment of racially polarized
voting as a constitutional taboo is historically unfounded and
doctrinally incoherent.
There are significant implications for acknowledging the role of
racially polarized voting during Reconstruction. This historical insight
moves vote dilution claims—and their predicate finding of racially
polarized voting—far closer to the heart of the Reconstruction
Amendments and challenges the Court’s hostility to race-based
redistricting. It is powerful evidence that Congress is well within its
enforcement authority to remedy and deter dilutive measures that
exploit racially polarized voting. Finally, reconstructing racially
polarized voting helps reorient voting rights doctrine toward a
Fifteenth Amendment framework.
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INTRODUCTION
Racially polarized voting stalks our democracy. A half century
after the civil rights movement, race remains a central fault line in
elections across the country. In fact, polarization between Black and
White voters has increased nationwide since the mid-1990s and is
particularly high in the South.1 Racially polarized voting “increases the
vulnerability of racial minorities to discriminatory changes in voting
law.”2 That is because a law designed to diminish minority voting
strength will not have its intended discriminatory effect unless racial
groups vote as a bloc.3 In other words, gerrymanderers can exploit
racially polarized voting when drawing maps to reduce or effectively
eliminate minority political power. Racially polarized voting thus
implicates nearly every voting rights doctrine.
Perhaps most prominently, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
(“VRA”)4 ensures that minority voters are not “packed” or “cracked”
in a redistricting plan, thereby diluting their voting strength.5 Under
Thornburg v. Gingles,6 racially polarized voting is a necessary—but not
a sufficient—condition for a statutory vote dilution claim.7 The so1. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1323, 1349 (2016)
[hereinafter Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power].
2. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 578 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also
N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 222 (4th Cir. 2016) (“Racially polarized
voting is not, in and of itself, evidence of racial discrimination. But it does provide an incentive
for intentional discrimination in the regulation of elections.”).
3. See, e.g., McCrory, 831 F.3d at 222 (“It is the political cohesiveness of the minority groups
that provides the political payoff for legislators who seek to dilute or limit the minority vote.”).
4. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2018). Section 2 is a “permanent, nationwide ban on racial
discrimination in voting.” Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 557. Section 2 covers both vote denial and
vote dilution claims and imposes liability based on a finding of discriminatory intent or effect. See
Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 229, 243–44 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc). For a discussion of how to
establish liability under Section 2, see infra Part I.C.
5. See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1663, 1671–72 (2001) [hereinafter Gerken, Undiluted Vote].
6. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
7. See id. at 48–51. Vote dilution can also occur if districts violate the one-person, one-vote
principle. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563 (1964). This Article uses vote dilution as a
shorthand for racial vote dilution.
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called Gingles factors thus require plaintiffs to establish that racial
minorities are “politically cohesive” and that the “majority votes
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s
preferred candidate.”8
Notwithstanding its centrality under Gingles, the role of racial bloc
voting under current doctrine is hotly contested—a debate that reflects
the colorblind concerns now animating equal protection doctrine. This
view was perhaps best captured in Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion
in Holder v. Hall,9 where he declared that “[t]he assumptions upon
which our vote dilution decisions have been based should be repugnant
to any nation that strives for the ideal of a color-blind Constitution.”10
In addition, a plurality of the Court cast doubt on Section 2’s
constitutionality when it cautioned against an interpretation that
“unnecessarily infuse[d] race into virtually every redistricting” plan.11
Justices have also questioned whether Congress can exercise its
Reconstruction Amendment enforcement authority to remedy racial
bloc voting, which they have characterized as private action by voters.12
The Court thus views Section 2’s race-conscious predicate for liability
with suspicion.
These colorblind sentiments have surfaced outside the four
corners of vote dilution doctrine. In Shaw v. Reno,13 the Court created
an “analytically distinct”14 racial gerrymandering cause of action under
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause to challenge
majority-minority districts.15 Under Shaw, if “race was the
predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision to place a

8. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51. This Article uses the terms “racially polarized voting” and “racial
bloc voting” interchangeably. There is no magic ratio for racial bloc voting, and the legally
sufficient ratio “will vary according to a variety of factual circumstances.” Id. at 57–58; see also
Christopher S. Elmendorf, Kevin M. Quinn & Marisa A. Abrajano, Racially Polarized Voting, 83
U. CHI. L. REV. 587, 611 (2016) [hereinafter Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting] (finding
that “the lower courts have been very reluctant to establish quantitative cutoffs for what is, or is
not, legally significant minority cohesion”); infra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.
9. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994).
10. Id. at 905–06 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
11. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 21 (2009) (plurality opinion) (quoting League of United
Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 446 (2006) (opinion of Kennedy, J.)).
12. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 216–17 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); infra Parts II.B–C.
13. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
14. Id. at 652.
15. See id. at 658.
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significant number of voters within or without a particular district,”16
then the legislature must establish that the “district . . . withstand[s]
strict scrutiny.”17 In justifying this new cause of action, the Court
harshly criticized the purposeful creation of majority-minority districts.
According to the Court, “the perception that members of the same
racial group . . . think alike, share the same political interests, and will
prefer the same candidates at the polls” is an “impermissible racial
stereotype[].”18 Because Section 2 ties liability to the presence of racial
bloc voting and mandates the creation of majority-minority districts
under certain circumstances, Shaw has long been viewed as being on a
collision course with the VRA.19
At the core of the Court’s anxiety about race and voting is a belief
that race-based redistricting “balkanize[s] us into competing racial
factions” and “threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political
system in which race no longer matters—a goal that the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation
continues to aspire.”20 Despite its invocation of the Reconstruction
Amendments, the Court implicitly treats racially polarized voting as a
recent development, one that emerged after the passage of the VRA
and the widespread reenfranchisement of Black voters in the South.
Compounding this error, the Court assumes that the Constitution
uniquely empowers the judiciary to push our nation toward a postracial politics. Put simply, the Court presumes that the Reconstruction
Amendments envision a society where racially polarized voting no
longer exists. But the Court has reached this conclusion only by
ignoring the historical context of the Reconstruction Amendments and
by transplanting its colorblind jurisprudence from the Equal Protection
Clause to the political realm.21

16. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).
17. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1464 (2017).
18. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647.
19. See Gerken, Undiluted Vote, supra note 5, at 1696–98.
20. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657; see also id. at 648 (commenting that “a racial gerrymander may
exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes
said to counteract”).
21. See Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation
of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1845 (1992) [hereinafter Issacharoff,
Polarized Voting] (commenting that “[t]he Court [has] recast voting rights claims in the mold of
Washington v. Davis”).
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My central claim is that the Reconstruction Framers recognized
the realities of racially polarized voting and that, given the prominent
role of originalism on the Court today,22 this fact complicates the
application of colorblind principles to vote dilution claims. At the
outset, it is important to dispel the myth that the Constitution is
oblivious of political parties. Whereas the Founders failed to foresee
the rise of party politics,23 the Reconstruction Framers were intimately
familiar with partisanship. Indeed, the Reconstruction Amendments
were passed and ratified along nearly uniform party-line votes.24
Prior to the Fifteenth Amendment, Republicans received
overwhelming support from newly enfranchised Black voters in the
former Confederate States and expected that support to continue.25
Racially polarized voting was a feature—not a bug—in the passage and
ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court’s
apprehension about acknowledging the existence of racially polarized
voting is misplaced.
Recognizing the role of racially polarized voting in the ratification
of the Fifteenth Amendment has significant doctrinal and normative
implications. This historical insight moves vote dilution claims—and
their predicate finding of racial bloc voting—far closer to the heart of
the Reconstruction Amendments. At a minimum, it is powerful
evidence that Congress is well within its Reconstruction Amendment

22. See, e.g., William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2352–53
(2015).
23. See, e.g., Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2320–21 (2020); Daryl J. Levinson &
Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2313 (2006).
24. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS
AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 398–400 (2012) [hereinafter AMAR, UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION];
see also Michael S. Kang, Hyperpartisan Gerrymandering, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1379, 1393–94 (2020)
[hereinafter Kang, Hyperpartisan Gerrymandering] (discussing partisanship in the nineteenth
century).
25. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 236 (1998) [hereinafter
ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS] (attributing President Grant’s popular-vote victory in the
1868 election to Black voters in the former Confederacy); Vikram David Amar & Alan
Brownstein, The Hybrid Nature of Political Rights, 50 STAN. L. REV. 915, 943 (1998) (“New black
voters were expected to vote Republican . . . .”); Travis Crum, The Superfluous Fifteenth
Amendment?, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1549, 1597 (2020) [hereinafter Crum, Superfluous] (discussing
the Reconstruction Framers’ “ideological, partisan, and pragmatic” motives for supporting the
Fifteenth Amendment).
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enforcement authority to remedy and deter dilutive measures that
exploit racially polarized voting.26
In addition, viewing racially polarized voting from the perspective
of Reconstruction challenges the Court’s hostility toward race-based
redistricting. After all, if the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified on the
premise that racially polarized voting exists, then the Court’s treatment
of racially polarized voting as constitutionally taboo is historically
unfounded. And it is especially difficult to square the Court’s selfproclaimed power to push our nation toward a post-racial politics with
the Reconstruction Framers’ understanding about both the judiciary’s
proper role and the persistence of racial bloc voting.
Perhaps most ambitiously, reconstructing racially polarized voting
reorients voting rights doctrine away from the tired debates
surrounding the Equal Protection Clause. The Reconstruction Framers
demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of the intersection of race
and politics. The Court’s refusal to even acknowledge these insights
has contributed to the tension within current doctrine between vote
dilution and racial gerrymandering claims. Rather than embodying a
colorblind worldview, the central premise of the Fifteenth Amendment
was to empower racial minorities through the ballot. And although
other scholars correctly point out that voting rights are distinct from
civil rights and thus deserve a different doctrinal framework, these
accounts are derived from political theory and statutory interpretation,
rather than a historical and contextual understanding of the
Reconstruction Amendments.27 To be clear, I am not arguing that
racially polarized voting is a desirable or inevitable characteristic of our
democracy. Rather, my claim is that contemporary doctrine should
account for the fact that the Reconstruction Framers were aware of

26. The Court has declined to decide whether vote dilution claims are cognizable under the
Fifteenth Amendment. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 159 (1993). The Court, however,
has recognized such claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S.
755, 765–67 (1973); see also infra Part I.C.1.
27. See, e.g., Gerken, Undiluted Vote, supra note 5, at 1671 & n.9 (focusing on Section 2 in
analyzing vote dilution claims); Michael S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE
L.J. 734, 736–38 (2008) [hereinafter Kang, Democratic Contestation] (discussing the concept of
democratic contestation in relation to the VRA); Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why
Voting is Different, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1201, 1202 (1996) (“We believe that the Court’s attempt to
integrate voting rights law into its more general approach to affirmative action is both misguided
and incoherent.”). But see Amar & Brownstein, supra note 25, at 919 (arguing that the Shaw
“Court’s approach directly contradicts the reasoning and objectives of the framers and ratifiers of
the Fifteenth Amendment”).
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racially polarized voting and developed their political and
constitutional strategies in its shadow.
Finally, this Article’s revitalization of the Fifteenth Amendment
is especially timely given that 2020 marks the Amendment’s 150th
anniversary.28 The Fifteenth Amendment has been largely
overshadowed by the Fourteenth Amendment and the VRA,29 but it
played a vital role in establishing and then restoring our nation’s
multiracial democracy.30 Moreover, this summer’s Black Lives Matter
protests have forced a reckoning with our nation’s racist past and
present on a scale not witnessed since the civil rights movement.31 And
the recent passing of civil rights icon John Lewis has reignited calls to
revise and expand the VRA.32
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I surveys the existence of
racially polarized voting today and then explains how racially polarized
voting is treated as part of a racial vote dilution claim under the
Constitution and the VRA. Part II outlines the most frequent criticisms
of considering racially polarized voting as part of a vote dilution claim.
Part III examines racially polarized voting during Reconstruction and
its central role in the Fifteenth Amendment’s passage and ratification.
Part IV argues that recognizing the role of racial bloc voting during
Reconstruction not only strengthens the Gingles factors but also helps
reconceptualize vote dilution claims under the Fifteenth
Amendment.33
28. 16 Stat. 1131 (1870). The Fifteenth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of citizens of
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude,” U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1, and
empowers Congress to “enforce [it] by appropriate legislation,” id. § 2.
29. See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 25, at 1550–51.
30. See id. at 1621–22.
31. See Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the
Largest Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://nyti.ms/2ZqRyOU
[https://perma.cc/WX2R-62RP] (discussing the extraordinary scale of the Black Lives Matter
protests).
32. See Ari Berman, Senators Introduced a Bill To Restore the Voting Rights Act. It’s Named
After John Lewis, MOTHER JONES (July 22, 2020), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2020/07/
senators-just-introduced-a-bill-to-restore-the-voting-rights-act-its-named-after-john-lewis
[https://perma.cc/S7PZ-FGMY] (explaining the newly introduced John Lewis Voting Rights
Advancement Act).
33. Before moving on, a couple caveats. I primarily discuss Black–White polarization for
three reasons. First, although the rights of other minorities were discussed during Reconstruction,
the principal debate over the Fifteenth Amendment concerned the enfranchisement of Black
citizens. See WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE
FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 46, 58 (2d ed. 1969). Second, Black–White polarization is currently and
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I. UNDERSTANDING RACIAL VOTE DILUTION
This Part defines racially polarized voting and provides a brief
overview of its role in contemporary American politics. It then charts
the development of racial vote dilution doctrine under both the
Constitution and the VRA and discusses the doctrinal relevance of
racially polarized voting.
A. Defining Racially Polarized Voting
Racially polarized voting and vote dilution are intertwined
concepts. Racially polarized voting has legal significance because it can
be exploited by gerrymanderers to dilute minority voting power.34 In
jurisdictions with racially polarized voting, politicians can predict that
certain redistricting schemes—such as “packing” or “cracking”
minority voters or using numbered posts in an at-large election—will
dilute minority voting strength.35 Racially polarized voting thus
“increases the vulnerability of racial minorities to discriminatory
changes in voting law” by putting them “at risk of being systematically
outvoted and having their interests underrepresented in legislatures”

has historically been more severe than polarization between White voters and other minorities.
See Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, supra note 1, at 1357. And third, the overwhelming
majority of Section 2 suits have been brought by Black plaintiffs. See Ellen Katz, Margaret
Aisenbrey, Anna Baldwin, Emma Cheuse & Anna Weisbrodt, Documenting Discrimination in
Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 643, 656 (2006) [hereinafter Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination] (finding that
Black plaintiffs brought 82.2 percent of Section 2 cases between 1982 and 2006).
Furthermore, even though the Fifteenth Amendment enfranchised only men of color and
left women of color without the right to vote, I will generally avoid using gendered terms to
streamline the reading process and to focus on race. For a thorough discussion of the women’s
suffrage movement, see generally Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment,
Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947 (2002). For a recent academic
account of the intersection of race and sex in the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, see
generally Catherine Powell & Camille Gear Rich, The “Welfare Queen” Goes to the Polls: RaceBased Fractures in Gender Politics and Opportunities for Intersectional Coalitions, 108 GEO. L.J.
105 (2020).
Finally, although the norms on this issue are still evolving, I have opted to capitalize both
Black and White when used as racial identifiers. See Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Case for
Capitalizing the B in Black, ATLANTIC (June 18, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/
ideas/archive/2020/06/time-to-capitalize-blackand-white/613159 [https://perma.cc/K988-5YVY]
(“Black and white are both historically created racial identities—and whatever rule applies to one
should apply to the other.”).
34. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 578 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
35. See, e.g., N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 222 (4th Cir. 2016);
Gerken, Undiluted Vote, supra note 5, at 1672.
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and by creating “an incentive to prevent changes in the existing balance
of voting power.”36 As explained below,37 vote dilution—that is, the
redistricting map or electoral scheme that prevents minorities from
having an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice—violates
both the Constitution and the VRA. Racially polarized voting itself is
neither a constitutional nor a statutory violation but is rather a
predicate condition for vote dilution.38
Although racially polarized voting is an intuitive concept, it defies
easy doctrinal definition. There is no fixed formula for ascertaining
when voting is racially polarized.39 Rather, the inquiry is whether
minorities are “politically cohesive” and whether the “majority votes
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s
preferred candidate.”40 The legally sufficient ratio “will vary according
to a variety of factual circumstances,”41 including the percentage of
registered voters who are minorities, the presence of majority-vote
requirements, the use of designated posts in multimember elections,
and the size of the district.42 Moreover, racial bloc voting need not
occur in every election in the district, and the victory of a minority
candidate in a particular election does not foreclose a finding of racially

36. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 578 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
37. See infra Part I.C.
38. See Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 578 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Professor Chris Elmendorf
has a distinct take on racially polarized voting. He raises the provocative thesis that certain
“election outcome[s] [are] unconstitutional owing to the racial basis for the electorate’s verdict”
and that “Section 2 prevents or compensates for a type of constitutional violation that the courts
cannot remedy through ordinary constitutional litigation.” Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making
Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes, Unconstitutional Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160
U. PA. L. REV. 377, 456 (2012) [hereinafter Elmendorf, Biased Votes]. My argument does not go
so far. My claim differs from Elmendorf’s in at least two salient ways. First, I examine the role of
racially polarized voting during Reconstruction—a period that Elmendorf ignores—to argue that
the Court’s treatment of racial bloc voting as a legal taboo is historically inaccurate and doctrinally
incoherent. And second, I disagree with Elmendorf that certain elections are themselves
unconstitutional due to racial bloc voting. My focus, instead, is on the dilutive measures that
exploit racial bloc voting. As Professors Pam Karlan and Daryl Levinson argue, even though
citizens’ voting preferences are assuredly protected and “the government cannot reach and
regulate directly the private decisionmaking that produces a disparate racial impact,” the law
should not give those preferences effect through electoral mechanisms that predictably dilute the
votes of politically cohesive racial minorities. Karlan & Levinson, supra note 27, at 1228.
39. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 58 (1986) (“[T]here is no simple doctrinal test for
the existence of legally significant racial bloc voting.”).
40. Id. at 51.
41. Id. at 57–58.
42. See id. at 57.
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polarized voting.43 In light of this doctrinal uncertainty, one recent
study found that “lower courts have been very reluctant to establish
quantitative cutoffs for what is, or is not, legally significant minority
cohesion.”44
In addition, “the race of the candidate per se is irrelevant to racial
bloc voting analysis.”45 A White politician can be the candidate of
choice of minorities and, conversely, a minority candidate is not
necessarily the minority community’s candidate of choice. To cite one
prominent example from the case law: Henry Bonilla, a Hispanic
Republican Congressman from Texas, was not the candidate of choice
for Hispanics living in his district.46
For litigation purposes, racially polarized voting is usually
demonstrated “through the use of bivariate statistical analyses such as
. . . ecological regression, instead of multiple regression analyses that
try to control for the influence of nonracial factors.”47 Put simply, racial
bloc voting is established using statistical methods that look for
correlation, not causation.48 That is because most courts do not require
plaintiffs to prove the underlying causes of racially polarized voting.49
Although disentangling these causal factors is outside the scope of
this Article,50 racial bloc voting has numerous potential causes.51 These
include racist sentiments among White voters,52 in-group favoritism
43. Id.
44. Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 8, at 611.
45. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 67 (plurality opinion).
46. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 428 (2006).
47. John M. Powers, Note, Statistical Evidence of Racially Polarized Voting in the Obama
Elections, and Implications for Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 102 GEO. L.J. 881, 889 (2014).
48. See id.
49. See id.; see also infra notes 108–13 and accompanying text.
50. Also outside the scope of this Article is the so-called “race or party” question: When a
law disproportionately impacts both minorities and a particular political party in a jurisdiction
with racial bloc voting, how should a court determine whether race or party motivated the law’s
enactment? See Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party, Race as Party, or Party All the Time: Three
Uneasy Approaches to Conjoined Polarization in Redistricting and Voting Cases, 59 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1837, 1840–41 (2018) [hereinafter Hasen, Race or Party].
51. See Karlan & Levinson, supra note 27, at 1229 (observing that “present-day racial bloc
voting may itself be the product of past de jure race discrimination”).
52. See, e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, The Geography of Racial
Stereotyping: Evidence and Implications for VRA Preclearance After Shelby County, 102 CALIF.
L. REV. 1123, 1127 (2014) [hereinafter Elmendorf & Spencer, Racial Stereotyping] (“[O]ur
ranking of states by anti-black stereotyping correlates very highly—but not perfectly—with
rankings based on black population share and racially polarizing voting in the 2008 presidential
election.”).
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within minority groups,53 as well as stark racial divides in important
indicators like socioeconomic status,54 educational attainment,55 and
incarceration rates.56 The decades-long exodus of socially conservative
White southerners from the Democratic Party is also frequently
identified as a major factor in contemporary racially polarized voting.57
Racial bloc voting remains an undeniable feature of political life in
twenty-first century America.
B. Racially Polarized Voting Today
Despite “[t]he historic accomplishments of the Voting Rights
Act,”58 “racially polarized voting [is] not ancient history.”59 Indeed,
racially polarized voting is well-known to even a casual political
observer. Any cable news show recapping an election will focus on the
intersection of race, geography, and partisanship in predicting and
reporting election results. The fact that Black voters almost uniformly
support Democrats and that White southerners tend to vote for
Republicans is a political truism—entire campaigns are built around
this principle.60
This political truism is borne out by the data. Consider the most
recent presidential election. In 2016, White voters backed Donald

53. See, e.g., Tasha S. Philpot & Hanes Walton, Jr., One of Our Own: Black Female
Candidates and the Voters Who Support Them, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 49, 50 (2007) (“Black voting
behavior, especially as it relates to support for black candidates, is thought to be a function of a
sense of group identification. . . . Consequently, research has found that blacks in particular use
what happens to the group as a proxy for individual self-interests.”).
54. See, e.g., Courtney E. Martin, Opinion, Closing the Racial Wealth Gap, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
23, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2W3AE66 [https://perma.cc/7M8P-AQHY] (“The median white family
has 41 times more wealth than the median African-American family . . . .”).
55. See, e.g., Schuette v. Coal. to Def. Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 334 (2014) (Breyer,
J., concurring in the judgment) (“[L]ow educational achievement continues to be correlated with
income and race.”).
56. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 7 (2012) (“In some states, black men have been admitted to prison on
drug charges at rates twenty to fifty times greater than those of white men.”).
57. See, e.g., Bruce E. Cain & Emily R. Zhang, Blurred Lines: Conjoined Polarization and
Voting Rights, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 867, 875 (2016).
58. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 201 (2009).
59. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 25 (2009) (plurality opinion).
60. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 VA.
L. REV. 1537, 1554–55 (2004) (discussing Nixon’s Southern Strategy to appeal to White
southerners disaffected with busing, desegregation, and the civil rights movement).
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Trump over Hillary Clinton by a 21-point margin,61 and Black voters
preferred Clinton by an 80-point margin.62 Or take the 2008 election.
Although the election of Barack Obama, the United States’ first Black
president, is frequently celebrated as a post-racial moment, “racial
polarization . . . actually increased in the 2008 election.”63
These examples are not outliers. In fact, since the passage of the
VRA in 1965, Republicans have won at least a plurality of the White
vote and Democrats have overwhelmingly won the Black vote in every
presidential election.64 These election results, therefore, reflect racial
divisions that are long-standing—and worsening. As Professor Nick
Stephanopoulos recently found, Black–White polarization “gradual[ly]
declin[ed] from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s and [it has] slow[ly]
ascen[ded] ever since.”65
Unsurprisingly then, racial polarization runs deeper than
presidential politics. Racial bloc voting occurs in legislative elections at
the federal, state, and local level.66 The existence of racially polarized
voting in these elections is especially relevant because Section 2
litigation has historically challenged the drawing of districts.67
61. Alec Tyson & Shiva Maniam, Behind Trump’s Victory: Divisions by Race, Gender,
Education, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/09/
behind-trumps-victory-divisions-by-race-gender-education [https://perma.cc/KYN6-RHHP].
62. Id.
63. Stephen Ansolabehere, Nathaniel Persily & Charles Stewart III, Regional Differences in
Racial Polarization in the 2012 Presidential Election: Implications for the Constitutionality of
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 205, 205 (2013) (emphasis added). Before
the 2008 general election, Obama benefited from significant cohesion among Black voters in the
Democratic primaries. See, e.g., Powers, supra note 47, at 909.
64. See Stephen Ansolabehere, Nathaniel Persily & Charles Stewart III, Race, Region, and
Vote Choice in the 2008 Election: Implications for the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 123 HARV.
L. REV. 1385, 1401 (2010) [hereinafter Ansolabehere et al., 2008 Election] (examining racial
voting patterns in the 1968 through 2008 elections); Powers, supra note 47, at 883 (2012 election);
Tyson & Maniam, supra note 61 (2016 election).
65. Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, supra note 1, at 1349.
66. See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 33, at 756–70 tbl.B (compiling
cases where the Gingles factors were satisfied).
67. See Ansolabehere et al., 2008 Election, supra note 64, at 1391. In the past decade, there
has been an increase in vote denial cases brought under Section 2 as states have enacted
discriminatory voter-suppression laws. See, e.g., Veasey v. Abbott, 888 F.3d 792, 804 (5th Cir.
2018) (upholding Texas’s revised voter ID law); N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831
F.3d 204, 242 (4th Cir. 2016) (invalidating North Carolina’s post-Shelby County voter-suppression
law). For recent academic discussions of Section 2’s application to vote denial claims, see
generally Pamela S. Karlan, Turnout, Tenuousness, and Getting Results in Section 2 Vote Denial
Claims, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 763 (2016); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Disparate Impact, Unified Law,
128 YALE L.J. 1566 (2019) [hereinafter Stephanopoulos, Disparate Impact]; Daniel P. Tokaji,
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Moreover, several studies have found that racism and racially
polarized voting are worse in the Southern States.68 These findings are
borne out in judicial decisions. In Professor Ellen Katz’s famous survey
of Section 2 decisions, courts found racially polarized voting in 105
cases between 1982 and 2006.69 Half of these suits were in jurisdictions
then covered by Section 5 of the VRA, where only a quarter of the
nation’s population resides.70 Given that racially polarized voting is a
precondition for liability under Section 2 and that the covered
jurisdictions were mostly in the Deep South, these decisions support
the conclusion that racially polarized voting remains higher in the
South than in the rest of the country.71
Thus, over fifty years after the passage of the VRA, discriminatory
barriers to vote have fallen, but racially polarized voting persists.

Applying Section 2 to the New Vote Denial, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 439 (2015); and Daniel
P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L.
REV. 689 (2006).
68. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 34 (2006) (noting that “the degree of racially
polarized voting in the South is increasing, not decreasing”); Elmendorf & Spencer, Racial
Stereotyping, supra note 52, at 1127 (finding that “the recently invalidated coverage formula
actually did a remarkably good job of picking out states whose non-black residents harbor
exceptionally negative stereotypes of African Americans”); Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and
Power, supra note 1, at 1349 (“Between 1972 and 2012, I find that black-white polarization was
higher in the South than in the non-South . . . .”).
69. See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 33, at 665.
70. See id. at 655, 665. Section 5 required certain covered jurisdictions—largely in the
South—to preclear all voting changes with federal authorities. In 2006, Congress reauthorized
Section 4(b)’s coverage formula for determining which jurisdictions were subject to Section 5’s
preclearance requirement. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 537–39 (2013). The Shelby
County Court invalidated Section 4(b)’s coverage formula for violating the equal sovereignty
principle but “issue[d] no holding on § 5 itself.” Id. at 557.
71. Voting is also racially polarized between White people and other minority groups,
though to a lesser extent than between White and Black voters. See LAUGHLIN MCDONALD,
AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL VOTING RIGHTS 263 (2010) (attributing Native
American support for Democratic victories in the 2002 South Dakota Senate race, the 2004
Montana gubernatorial race, and the 2006 Montana Senate race); Stephanopoulos, Race, Place,
and Power, supra note 1, at 1357 (“Turning to Hispanic-white polarization, it was markedly lower
than black-white polarization from 1972 to 2012. It drifted around 25% in the average state,
compared to a black-white polarization mean of roughly 50%.”); Hansi Lo Wang, Trump Lost
More of the Asian-American Vote than the National Exit Polls Showed, NPR (Apr. 18, 2017, 2:19
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2017/04/18/524371847/trump-lost-more-of-the-asian-american-votethan-the-national-exit-polls-showed [https://perma.cc/BZA2-EA4N] (estimating that Clinton
won between 65 percent to 79 percent of the Asian American vote).
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C. Racial Vote Dilution Under the Constitution and the VRA
Vote dilution claims can be brought under the Fourteenth
Amendment and Section 2 of the VRA, though the latter is the driving
force of most voting rights litigation. Constitutional and statutory vote
dilution claims require different types of proof because they target
distinct dilutive schemes. Both inquiries look at the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether minorities have an opportunity to
elect their candidates of choice. But a constitutional vote dilution claim
requires a showing of invidious intent whereas Section 2 does not.
Furthermore, the Court’s adoption of the Gingles factors has shifted
the vote dilution inquiry away from a totality-of-the-circumstances
inquiry and moved a showing of racial bloc voting to center stage. The
upshot is that Section 2 mandates the creation of majority-minority
districts when a significant number of minorities are residentially
segregated and voting is racially polarized.
This Section discusses vote dilution claims under the Constitution
and Section 2 of the VRA as well as the themes that emerge from the
doctrine’s development.
1. The Development of the Doctrine. Notwithstanding the history
recounted below,72 the Court has interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment to largely subsume the Fifteenth Amendment’s
protections against racial discrimination in voting.73 Indeed, the Court
has repeatedly declined to decide whether vote dilution claims are
cognizable under the Fifteenth Amendment.74 The Court, however, has
recognized racial vote dilution claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The Court first invoked the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate
a redistricting scheme on racial vote dilution grounds in its 1973
72. See infra Part III.
73. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Colorblindness, Race Neutrality, and Voting Rights, 51
EMORY L.J. 1397, 1424 (2002) (“[T]he Fifteenth Amendment’s requirement of equal voting rights
often appears to go no further than the protection now afforded by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”); Crum, Superfluous, supra note 25, at 1557–64 (canvassing how the Court’s
current doctrine conflates the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments).
74. See Reno v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish II), 528 U.S. 320, 334 n.3 (2000) (“[W]e
have never held that vote dilution violates the Fifteenth Amendment.”); Voinovich v. Quilter,
507 U.S. 146, 159 (1993) (“This Court has not decided whether the Fifteenth Amendment applies
to vote-dilution claims.”); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 142 n.14 (1976) (“There is no
decision in this Court holding a legislative apportionment or reapportionment violative of the
Fifteenth Amendment.”).
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decision in White v. Regester.75 According to the Court, plaintiffs
bringing vote dilution claims must show that “the political processes
leading to nomination and election were not equally open to
participation by the group in question—that its members had less
opportunity . . . to participate in the political processes and to elect
legislators of their choice.”76 In so holding, the Court expressly rejected
the notion that minorities are entitled to proportional representation.77
Instead, the Court adopted a “totality of the circumstances”78 standard
and identified a variety of relevant factors. These included the number
of minorities elected to office, the jurisdiction’s history of racial
discrimination in voting, racial inequities in several socioeconomic
indicators, racial campaign tactics, discriminatory candidate slating, the
use of numbered posts in at-large elections, and legislators’
responsiveness to the minority community’s concerns.79 Most
importantly for present purposes, the White Court also identified
racially polarized voting as a relevant factor.80
Although White heralded a new era of racial vote dilution claims
under the Fourteenth Amendment, developments in the 1980s resulted
in such claims being brought under the VRA. In City of Mobile v.
Bolden,81 a plurality of the Court concluded that plaintiffs must prove
discriminatory intent to establish a racial vote dilution claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment,82 a point a majority of the Court later

75. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765–69 (1973); see also James U. Blacksher & Larry T.
Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden: Have the White Suburbs
Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 22 (1982) (noting White’s
unprecedented holding). Although White was the first case where the Court struck down a plan
on racial vote dilution grounds, the Court had left open the possibility in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403
U.S. 124, 141–44 (1971).
76. White, 412 U.S. at 766.
77. See id. at 765–66 (“To sustain such claims, it is not enough that the racial group allegedly
discriminated against has not had legislative seats in proportion to its voting potential.”).
78. Id. at 769.
79. See id. at 766–69.
80. The Court did not use the magic words “racially polarized voting” or “racial bloc voting,”
but the point is clear. See id. at 766–67 (explaining that the “white-dominated” Democratic Party
in Dallas County “did not need the support of the Negro community to win elections in the
county”); id. at 767 (describing “racial campaign tactics in white precincts to defeat candidates
who had the overwhelming support of the black community” (quoting Graves v. Barnes, 343 F.
Supp. 704, 726–27 (W.D. Tex. 1972) (per curiam))).
81. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
82. See id. at 66–67 (plurality opinion).
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confirmed in Rogers v. Lodge.83 On this front, the Court’s approach
mirrored a broader turn in equal protection jurisprudence toward an
intent requirement.84
In addition, the Bolden plurality determined that the Fifteenth
Amendment, like the Fourteenth, has an intent requirement.85 The
Bolden plurality, however, determined that the Fifteenth Amendment
does not encompass vote dilution claims.86 And because Section 2 of
the VRA “no more than elaborate[d] upon . . . the Fifteenth
Amendment,”87 the Bolden plurality reasoned that the two were
coextensive.88
After Bolden, “a good deal of voting rights litigation ground to a
halt.”89 Concerned about Bolden’s dramatic impact,90 Congress revised
Section 2 in 1982 to eliminate the intent requirement and to authorize
vote dilution claims.91 In recognizing a discriminatory effects claim,
Congress relied on its Reconstruction Amendment enforcement
authority to enact prophylactic legislation.92

83. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982).
84. See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 66 (plurality opinion) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
248 (1976)); Issacharoff, Polarized Voting, supra note 21, at 1845 (arguing that Bolden “recast
voting rights claims in the mold of Washington v. Davis”). But see Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of
Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1127–28 (1989) (arguing that the intent analysis
employed in racial vote dilution cases differs from civil rights cases).
85. See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 62 (plurality opinion).
86. See id. at 65. Although Rogers transformed Bolden’s conclusion on the Fourteenth
Amendment into a holding, the Rogers Court “express[ed] no view on the application of the
Fifteenth Amendment to th[e] case.” Rogers, 458 U.S. at 619 n.6.
87. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 60 (plurality opinion).
88. See id. at 60–61.
89. Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
7 (2008).
90. Bolden’s timing was propitious for defenders of minority voting rights. The VRA’s
coverage formula and Section 5 were set to expire in 1982, and Congress used that opportunity to
amend Section 2. See id. at 7 n.22.
91. See id. at 7–8 (discussing Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205,
§ 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134)); see also 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2018) (prohibiting election laws that “result[]
in a denial or abridgment of [the] right . . . to vote on account of race”).
92. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 383–84 (1991) (“In 1982, Congress amended § 2 of
the Voting Rights Act to make clear that certain practices and procedures that result in the denial
or abridgment of the right to vote are forbidden even though the absence of proof of
discriminatory intent protects them from constitutional challenge.” (footnote omitted)); Michael
T. Morley, Prophylactic Redistricting? Congress’s Section 5 Power and the New Equal Protection
Right to Vote, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2053, 2072–74 (2018) (discussing how the VRA is an
exercise of Congress’s Reconstruction Amendment enforcement authority); see also Nev. Dep’t
of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727–28 (2003) (“Congress may enact so-called prophylactic
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The 1982 amendments to Section 2 clearly borrowed from White’s
approach. Echoing White, Section 2’s text refers to a “totality of [the]
circumstances” standard that examines whether minorities “have less
opportunity . . . to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice.”93 Like White, Section 2 identifies as a
relevant factor “[t]he extent to which members of a protected class
have been elected to office.”94 The accompanying Senate Report lists
several additional factors drawn from White, including racially
polarized voting.95 And, following White, Section 2’s text disavows a
proportionality standard.96
But the resurrection of White’s totality-of-the-circumstances
standard proved fleeting. In its 1986 decision in Thornburg v. Gingles,
the Court announced three “necessary preconditions” for statutory
vote dilution claims.97 First, the minority group must be “sufficiently
large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a singlemember district.”98 Second, the minority group must be “politically
cohesive.”99 And third, White bloc voting must “usually . . . defeat the
minority’s preferred candidate.”100 Although technically three factors,

legislation that proscribes facially constitutional conduct, in order to prevent and deter
unconstitutional conduct.”). Parsing the Reconstruction Amendments, Congress did not need to
rely on its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority to prohibit intentionally discriminatory
vote dilution. However, Congress arguably relied on its Fifteenth Amendment enforcement
authority to the extent that those claims have not yet been recognized under that Amendment.
For more on this point, see infra notes 204–05 and accompanying text.
93. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b).
94. Id.
95. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982); see also Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized
Voting, supra note 8, at 597 (commenting that the Senate Report borrowed factors “from the
constitutional vote dilution jurisprudence of the 1970s”); Issacharoff, Polarized Voting, supra note
21, at 1848 (“The legislative history of the 1982 amendments introduces the formal recognition of
racially polarized voting patterns as a crucial ingredient of a vote dilution claim.”). The Senate
Report also drew from Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), a leading
pre-Bolden case.
96. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (“[N]othing in this section establishes a right to have members of a
protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.”).
97. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 51.
100. Id. The Gingles Court borrowed this test from an article written by two prominent voting
rights attorneys. See Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 75, at 50–64 (proposing the soon-to-be
Gingles factors); Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 8, at 597 (crediting
Blacksher and Menefee with developing the Gingles factors).
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Gingles boils down to whether a minority group is residentially
segregated and whether there is racially polarized voting.101
By focusing on residential segregation, the Gingles Court
reinforced the relationship between geography and representation.102
Put simply, “[t]he more residentially segregated a minority group is,
the more geographically compact the group is too, and so the easier it
should be for the group to satisfy Gingles’s first prong.”103 The
compactness requirement also bolsters Section 2’s manageability and
constitutionality by narrowing the statute’s scope. Without the
compactness inquiry, courts could be forced to draw bizarrely shaped
or geographically expansive districts or to accommodate minority
groups with miniscule populations.104 And in the long run, as residential
segregation (hopefully) decreases,105 minorities will find it harder to
satisfy Gingles’s first prong, since it becomes more difficult to draw a
compact single-member district.106

101. See Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, supra note 1, at 1327.
102. See Gerken, Undiluted Vote, supra note 5, at 1706 (“[T]he compactness requirement in
Gingles does not necessarily stem from the nature of the injury itself.”).
This linkage between geography and representation is not preordained, as demonstrated
by the California Voting Rights Act (“CVRA”), CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 14025–14032 (West. 2020).
Unlike its federal counterpart, the CVRA “does not require that the plaintiff prove a ‘compact
majority–minority’ district is possible for liability purposes,” though it does take that fact into
account “in developing a remedy.” Jauregui v. City of Palmdale, 226 Cal. App. 4th 781, 789 (2014)
(quoting Sanchez v. City of Modesto, 145 Cal. App. 4th 660, 669 (2006)); see also Kareem U.
Crayton, Reinventing Voting Rights Preclearance, 44 IND. L. REV. 201, 239–40 (2010) (observing
that the CVRA “entitles groups to sue even when they are too geographically dispersed to elect
a candidate of choice from a single member district in a county”). The upshot is that the CVRA
imposes a “lower standard” than the federal VRA. Joshua S. Sellers & Erin A. Scharff,
Preempting Politics: State Power and Local Democracy, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1383 (2020).
103. Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, supra note 1, at 1365.
104. See id. at 1338; Gerken, Undiluted Vote, supra note 5, at 1708. If the Shaw cause of action
had stayed tied to a bizarreness inquiry, the compactness requirement may have helped reconcile
the two doctrines, since a compact district would be unlikely to trigger strict scrutiny. See Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (observing that “reapportionment is one area in which
appearances do matter”); see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995) (abandoning
bizarreness as the touchstone); id. at 920 (adopting the predominance standard).
105. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 546
(2015) (noting that “many cities have become more diverse” since the 1960s); Nicholas O.
Stephanopoulos, Civil Rights in a Desegregating America, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1329, 1339 (2016)
(“Black-white segregation has declined sharply since 1970.”).
106. See Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and
Remedies After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 741 (1998) [hereinafter Karlan, Two Section
Twos].
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The second and third Gingles factors are essentially an inquiry into
whether voting is racially polarized.107 But despite its importance under
Section 2, there are still several open questions about what constitutes
legally significant racial bloc voting.
The Gingles Court, for example, failed to reach consensus on the
relevance of causation to the polarization inquiry. Under Justice
Brennan’s plurality opinion, the inquiry into racial bloc voting focuses
on correlation—not causation.108 According to Justice Brennan, courts
need not examine the underlying causes of racially polarized voting
because “the reasons black and white voters vote differently have no
relevance” under Section 2’s discriminatory effects standard.109 After
all, Brennan reasoned, the “critical question” under Section 2 is
whether the challenged practice “results in members of a protected
group having less opportunity . . . to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice.”110 By contrast, in her
concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor argued that courts should
examine the reasons for racial bloc voting.111 As O’Connor put it, “[i]n
a community that is polarized along racial lines, racial hostility may bar
. . . indirect avenues of political influence to a much greater extent than
in a community where racial animosity is absent although the interests
of racial groups diverge.”112 This causation question remains open, and
the circuits are split on it.113
And although there is no magic ratio for racial bloc voting under
Gingles,114 the Supreme Court has hinted at imposing strict quantitative
cutoffs for racial bloc voting. In so doing, it has indicated that the
Gingles factors are not hermetically sealed. In Bartlett v. Strickland,115

107. See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 33, at 664 (“[C]ourts that
consider racial bloc voting generally engage in one inquiry.”).
108. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 63 (1986) (plurality opinion) (stating that the
touchstone is the “correlation between race of voter and the selection of certain candidates”).
109. Id.
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. See id. at 100 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I believe Congress also
intended that explanations of the reasons why white voters rejected minority candidates would
be probative of the likelihood that candidates elected without decisive minority support would be
willing to take the minority’s interests into account.”).
112. Id.
113. See Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 8, at 614–15 (explaining that
the First and Fifth Circuits require a showing of causation whereas other circuits do not).
114. See supra notes 39–44 and accompanying text.
115. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009).
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the Court considered a question left open by Gingles: whether Section
2 requires the creation of a so-called crossover district, “one in which
minority voters make up less than a majority of the voting-age
population” but are still large enough to elect their candidate of choice
with White crossover voters.116 Because the State in Bartlett had
conceded the third Gingles factor, the Court could not resolve the case
on those grounds.117 Nonetheless, the plurality stated that it was
“skeptical that the bloc-voting test could be satisfied . . . where
minority voters . . . cannot elect their candidate of choice without
support from almost 20 percent of white voters.”118 The plurality then
concluded that Gingles’s first prong is satisfied only when a minority
group constitutes a majority in a single-member district.119 Thus, just as
Gingles acknowledged that “the percentage of registered voters in the
district who are . . . minorit[ies]”120 could impact the legally significant
ratio of racial bloc voting, the obverse is also true. The level of racially
polarized voting informed the scope of the compactness requirement,
resulting in a bright-line cutoff.
The Gingles factors do not end the doctrinal analysis. The Gingles
factors were developed in a case challenging multimember districts.121
However, in the early 1990s, the Court started applying the Gingles
factors to single-member redistricting plans.122 But simply applying the
Gingles factors to this new context raised its own questions. As
Professor Heather Gerken explains, “[t]he problem with extending
Gingles [to single-member districts] is that there is no clear baseline for

116. Id. at 13 (plurality opinion); see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46 n.12 (reserving judgment on
this point); Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1119 (2005)
[hereinafter Gerken, Second-Order] (defining a crossover or coalition district as one “with a
thirty-three to thirty-nine percent population of voters of color”). The Court had previously held
that so-called influence districts—where “a minority group can influence the outcome of an
election even if its preferred candidate cannot be elected”—were not required by Section 2.
Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 13 (plurality opinion) (citing League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry
(LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 445 (2006) (opinion of Kennedy, J.)).
117. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 16 (plurality opinion) (noting concession).
118. Id.; see also id. at 24 (“In areas with substantial crossover voting it is unlikely that the
plaintiffs would be able to establish the third Gingles precondition . . . .”); Elmendorf et al.,
Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 8, at 602 (discussing oral argument in Bartlett and remarking
that “at least five justices were open to the idea of numeric cutoffs for group cohesion”).
119. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 26 (plurality opinion).
120. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 56.
121. See id. at 34.
122. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40–41 (1993).
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determining how many additional majority-minority districts a state
can fairly be expected to create under § 2.”123
The Court sought to resolve that dilemma in Johnson v. De
Grandy.124 There, the Court made clear that the Gingles factors are
necessary but not sufficient to establish a vote dilution claim under
Section 2.125 The De Grandy Court reinvigorated the totality-of-thecircumstances inquiry and the opportunity-to-elect standard—but with
a twist. Despite Section 2’s textual disavowal of a right to
proportionality, the Court focused extensively on whether the number
of majority-minority districts was “roughly proportional to the
minority voters’ respective shares in the voting-age population.”126
Although disclaiming the creation of a “safe harbor,”127 the Court
nevertheless gave proportionality priority within the totality-of-thecircumstances inquiry.128
Today, the Gingles factors—as supplemented by De Grandy—
continue to govern vote dilution litigation, and Section 2 is the driving
force for vote dilution claims. Indeed, after Gingles, constitutional vote
dilution claims are rare.129 This development is unsurprising given that
it is far easier for plaintiffs to prove discriminatory effects under
Section 2 than discriminatory intent,130 and courts are reluctant to reach
a constitutional question when a case can be resolved on statutory

123. Gerken, Undiluted Vote, supra note 5, at 1675 (emphasis added).
124. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
125. See id. at 1011 (“But if Gingles so clearly identified the three as generally necessary to
prove a § 2 claim, it just as clearly declined to hold them sufficient in combination . . . .”).
126. Id. at 1000 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1024 (“[T]he totality of circumstances appears
not to support a finding of vote dilution here, where both minority groups constitute effective
voting majorities in a number of . . . districts substantially proportional to their share in the
population . . . .”).
127. Id. at 1018; see also id. at 1020–21 (“No single statistic provides courts with a shortcut to
determine whether a set of single-member districts unlawfully dilutes minority voting strength.”).
128. See Gerken, Undiluted Vote, supra note 5, at 1676 (explaining that, since De Grandy,
proportionality “has become the preeminent measure of fairness in redistricting”). This
development is likely due to the fact that “[a]n antidiscrimination results test necessarily
presupposes some benchmark conception of neutrality or fairness against which an allegedly
discriminatory result may be measured,” Elmendorf, Biased Votes, supra note 38, at 390, and
proportionality provided a manageable standard for single-member redistricting plans.
129. See Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE
L.J. 174, 201–02 (2007).
130. See Karlan, Two Section Twos, supra note 106, at 735; cf. Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias,
113 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 539 (2018) (“Judges are wary of accusing discriminators of bigotry.”).
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grounds.131 But in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s invalidation of
the VRA’s coverage formula in Shelby County v. Holder,132 plaintiffs
have started bringing constitutional claims.
This is because plaintiffs are now requesting bail-in relief under
Section 3(c) of the VRA. Pursuant to the bail-in provision, courts may
require states and political subdivisions that have violated the
Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to preclear all voting changes
with federal authorities.133 Section 3(c)’s constitutional trigger for
coverage means that plaintiffs must go above and beyond a
discriminatory effects claim and prove discriminatory intent.134
Although the most high-profile decisions have not ordered bail-in,135 a
district court recently concluded that the city of Pasadena, Texas,
engaged in intentionally discriminatory vote dilution and ordered bailin.136 And even though it declined to order bail-in,137 the Fourth Circuit
invalidated North Carolina’s post-Shelby County voter-suppression
law on intentional discrimination grounds rather than reach Section 2’s
application to vote-denial claims.138 Thus, even though Section 2

131. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 440 (2006)
(invalidating congressional district as violative of Section 2 while observing that Texas’s actions
bore “the mark of intentional discrimination that could give rise to an equal protection
violation”); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the
record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”).
132. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013).
133. 52 U.S.C. § 10302(c) (2018). Put simply, Section 3(c) is an alternative means of imposing
preclearance. See Travis Crum, Note, The Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger
Litigation and Dynamic Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992, 2006–09 (2010) [hereinafter Crum,
Pocket Trigger].
134. See Crum, Pocket Trigger, supra note 133, at 2009.
135. See Veasey v. Abbott, 888 F.3d 792, 804 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding that Texas’s revised
voter ID law meant that “there is no equitable basis for subjecting Texas to ongoing federal
election scrutiny under Section 3(c)”); N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204,
241–42 (4th Cir. 2016) (declining to bail-in North Carolina notwithstanding a finding of
intentional discrimination); Perez v. Abbott, 390 F. Supp. 3d 803, 807 (W.D. Tex. 2019) (finding
intentional discrimination in enactment of redistricting plan but declining request for Section 3(c)
relief); see also Travis Crum, The Prospect of Bailing-in Texas: Recent Bail-in Litigation,
ELECTION L. BLOG (Sept. 14, 2018, 9:39 AM) [hereinafter Crum, Recent Bail-in Litigation],
https://electionlawblog.org/?p=101137 [https://perma.cc/EYE5-TL68] (surveying cases).
136. See Patino v. City of Pasadena, 230 F. Supp. 3d 667, 729–30 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (ordering
bail-in of city in Texas); see also Allen v. City of Evergreen, No. 13-0107-CG-M, 2014 WL
12607819, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 13, 2014) (granting consent decree bailing-in city in Alabama).
137. See McCrory, 831 F.3d at 241–42.
138. See id. at 215; see also Michael J. Pitts, Rethinking Section 2 Vote Denial, 46 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 1, 21 n.85 (2018) (discussing McCrory’s discriminatory intent holding and commenting
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remains the primary defender of minority voting rights, there may be a
resurgence of constitutional vote dilution litigation in the coming
years.139
2. Themes from Racial Vote Dilution Doctrine. A few themes
emerge from this history. First, racially polarized voting has always
been a factor for adjudicating constitutional and statutory racial vote
dilution claims. Undoubtedly, racially polarized voting features more
prominently in statutory cases than constitutional ones. It is but one of
many factors for a constitutional vote dilution claim under White’s
totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry. By contrast, racial bloc voting
serves a gatekeeping function for a statutory claim. Indeed, “Gingles
brought the racially polarized voting inquiry into the undisputed and
unchallenged center of the Voting Rights Act.”140
Second, constitutional vote dilution doctrine is underdeveloped.
In fact, White is one of the only decisions where the Court has
invalidated a districting scheme on constitutional vote dilution
grounds.141 The Court, moreover, has repeatedly punted on whether
the Fifteenth Amendment applies to vote dilution claims.142 As
discussed more below,143 the scope and source of constitutional vote
dilution claims is not trivial and will matter in the inevitable
constitutional challenge to Section 2.
Third, although both constitutional and statutory vote dilution
doctrines look ultimately to whether minorities have an opportunity to
that it was “odd given that one would think that reversing the trial court on its discriminatoryresults analysis would be easier than on its discriminatory-purpose analysis”); Crum, Recent Bailin Litigation, supra note 135 (“[T]he Fourth Circuit . . . avoided a contentious legal question—the
appropriate standard under Section 2 for showing discriminatory effects in vote-denial
litigation—by making an inherently fact-bound discriminatory-intent finding.”).
139. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, RICHARD H. PILDES & NATHANIEL
PERSILY, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 644 (5th
ed. 2016) (observing that plaintiffs rarely pressed constitutional claims after the 1982 amendments
but predicting that such claims will increase post-Shelby County because of Section 3(c)).
140. Issacharoff, Polarized Voting, supra note 21, at 1851.
141. The Court also struck down an at-large plan on constitutional vote dilution grounds in
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 628 (1982). There, it emphasized that “[t]he minority’s voting
power in a multimember district is particularly diluted when bloc voting occurs and ballots are
cast along strict majority-minority lines.” Id. at 616; see also Luke P. McLoughlin, Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act and City of Boerne: The Continuity, Proximity, and Trajectory of Vote-Dilution
Standards, 31 VT. L. REV. 39, 46 (2006) (noting that “the Court [has] decided no claims of
unconstitutional minority vote dilution after its opaque decision in Rogers v. Lodge in 1982”).
142. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
143. See infra Parts II.C & IV.B.3.
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elect their candidate of choice, the Gingles factors are widely viewed
as bringing much-needed order to vote dilution litigation. Even at the
time,
White’s
totality-of-the-circumstances
standard
was
controversial—including among voting rights attorneys—for failing to
provide a predictable and workable rule.144 As Professor Sam
Issacharoff observes, “the best that White/Zimmer could muster was
the need to examine the ‘totality of the circumstances,’ an inquiry as
empty as the resigned ‘I know it when I see it’ approach to obscenity
under the First Amendment.”145 The Gingles factors provided an easily
administrable means of implementing Section 2’s opportunity-to-elect
standard.146
Fourth, Section 2 prohibits a wider swath of dilutive schemes than
the Fourteenth Amendment. As noted, Congress relied on its
enforcement authority in adopting a discriminatory effects standard
and thereby dispensing with the Equal Protection Clause’s intent
requirement.147 To be clear, Section 2’s discriminatory effects standard
is not entirely decoupled from a showing of intent. As in other areas of
anti-discrimination law,148 Section 2’s discriminatory effects standard is
designed to ferret out ways in which a particular electoral practice
“interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in
the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their

144. See Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 75, at 22 (criticizing White for “not articulat[ing]
uniform, manageable standards for determining when dilution violates the equal protection
clause” and for “largely recapitulat[ing] the district court’s factual findings”); Stephanopoulos,
Race, Place, and Power, supra note 1, at 1333 (“The conventional wisdom is that vote dilution
doctrine was formless mush before Gingles, rendering it arbitrary whether electoral arrangements
were struck down or upheld.”).
145. Issacharoff, Polarized Voting, supra note 21, at 1845.
146. See Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 149,
186 (2011) (arguing that Gingles created a “manageable, three-part test for proving vote
dilution”); Dale E. Ho, Something Old, Something New, or Something Really Old? Second
Generation Racial Gerrymandering Litigation as Intentional Racial Discrimination Cases, 59 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1887, 1915 (2018) (arguing that the Gingles preconditions were “intended to
create a judicially manageable standard for (and limit the reach of) a statutory claim for
discriminatory results”); Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself? Social
Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1549 n.93 (2002) (discussing Gingles’s
“reduction of the complex statutory conception of vote dilution into a far more manageable threeprong test”).
147. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S.
519, 521 (2015) (“Recognition of disparate-impact liability under the [Fair Housing Act] plays an
important role in uncovering discriminatory intent: it permits plaintiffs to counteract unconscious
prejudices and disguised animus that escape easy classification as disparate treatment.”).
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preferred representatives.”149 The Gingles preconditions and the
Senate Factors borrowed from White and Zimmer v. McKeithen150
examine how present and past discrimination impact the electoral
opportunities of minority voters.151 But regardless of the exactness of
the fit between the statutory standard and the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress relied on its enforcement authority to enact
Section 2’s discriminatory effects standard.152
Fifth, vote dilution litigation has profoundly impacted our nation’s
politics. Many early vote dilution cases were challenges to
multimember or at-large districts.153 These suits were incredibly
effective at dismantling these districts.154 As a result of this litigation
and Gingles’s application to single-member districts,155 the number of
Black representatives has increased dramatically over the past few
decades.156
Finally, by making racially polarized voting a threshold
requirement to a statutory vote dilution claim, the Gingles Court

149. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986); see also Stephanopoulos, Disparate Impact,
supra note 67, at 1566–67 (arguing that Section 2 should be construed consistently with other
disparate impact provisions).
150. Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc).
151. Id. at 1305–06; see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
152. The closeness of that fit and how the discriminatory effects standard is conceptualized
will matter for the inevitable constitutional challenge to Section 2. See Gerken, Undiluted Vote,
supra note 5, at 1674; see also infra notes 212–20 and accompanying text (explaining the
congruence and proportionality test from City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)).
153. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 34; Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 614 (1982); City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 58 (1980) (plurality opinion); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973);
see also Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 8, at 596 (noting that “[n]early all
of the [constitutional vote dilution] cases concerned at-large elections”).
154. See Cox & Miles, supra note 89, at 15 (finding that challenges to multimember districts
were over half of all Section 2 cases until the 2000s); Samuel Issacharoff, The Constitutional
Contours of Race and Politics, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 45, 48 (“With the 1982 Amendments to the
Voting Rights Act, Congress ushered in a decade-long period in which multimember and at-large
electoral arrangements ceded to minority-controlled single-member districts.”). The Dillard
lawsuit is the most dramatic example of second-generation litigation. There, over 160 county- and
city-level bodies were reorganized into single-member districts. See Dillard v. Baldwin Cty. Bd.
of Educ., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1461 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (Thompson, J.) (discussing the history of these
cases); Pamela S. Karlan, The Alabama Foundations of the Law of Democracy¸ 67 ALA. L. REV.
415, 430 (2015) (describing Dillard as the “most transformative single section 2 lawsuit”).
155. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40–41 (1993).
156. See Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, supra note 1, at 1395 (“In the average
southern state, the share of black state house members has jumped from about 13% before
[Gingles] to roughly 20% today. In the average nonsouthern state with a sizeable black
population, this proportion has grown from around 9% to close to 14%.” (footnote omitted)).
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fashioned a de facto sunset date for Section 2. In seeking to reinforce
Section 2 against an inevitable constitutional attack, several scholars
emphasize that minority plaintiffs will no longer be able to bring
Section 2 claims as the level of racially polarized voting decreases.157 It
may seem counterintuitive to argue that a statute’s future obsolescence
bolsters its constitutionality. However, this argument dovetails with the
doctrinal point that statutes enacted pursuant to Congress’s
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority are more likely to be
upheld if they have termination dates.158 This insight also appeals to the
Court’s intuition that it is the institution best situated to move our
nation toward the “goal of a political system in which race no longer
matters—a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire.”159
II. RACIAL VOTE DILUTION AND ITS DISCONTENTS
There are several criticisms of vote dilution doctrine generally and
of Section 2 in particular. In this Part, I focus on constitutional critiques
of the role of racial bloc voting in the vote dilution inquiry, rather than
on the contentions that Section 2 lacks a workable benchmark,160

157. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way for the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the
Opt-in Approach, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 708, 745 (2006) [hereinafter Gerken, Third Way] (“When
people cease to vote along racial lines, section 2 will become a paper tiger.”); Karlan, Two Section
Twos, supra note 106, at 741 (characterizing the Gingles factors as a “durational limit on section
2’s operation”).
158. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533 (1997) (listing “termination dates”
as an indicia of congruent and proportional legislation). The fact that the VRA’s coverage
formula had a termination date did not prevent the Court from invalidating it on equal
sovereignty grounds. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 538–39, 557 (2013).
159. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993).
160. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 902–03 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“[I]n selecting the proportion that will be used to define the undiluted strength of a minority—
the ratio that will provide the principle for decision in a vote dilution case—a court must make a
political choice.”).
In holding that partisan gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable, the Court recently
observed that the Constitution does not mandate proportional representation for political parties.
See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2499 (2019). The Rucho Court’s animosity toward
proportional representation has led some scholars to worry that a similar logic could be applied
to Section 2 and De Grandy’s rough proportionality standard. See Travis Crum, Rucho and
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, TAKE CARE BLOG (June 27, 2019), https://takecareblog.com/
blog/rucho-and-section-2-of-the-voting-rights-act [https://perma.cc/ZW98-UKMX] (“Rucho
channels concerns similar to those articulated in Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in Holder
v. Hall, where he criticized Section 2 for lacking a legitimate and manageable benchmark.”);
Nicholas Stephanopoulos, The Erasure of Racial Vote Dilution Doctrine, ELECTION L. BLOG
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protects only Democratic-leaning districts,161 or does not encompass
vote dilution claims as a matter of statutory interpretation.162
The Court’s unease with racially polarized voting crops up in
various doctrinal contexts across election law. The first and most
prominent criticism is that Section 2 requires the consideration of race
during the redistricting process. This critique reflects the Court’s more
general shift toward a colorblind Constitution and is essentially a crossapplication of the theories underlying the Shaw cause of action. The
second critique is that racially polarized voting is private action and
therefore outside the purview of the Reconstruction Amendments.
The final complaint is that Congress exceeded its Reconstruction
Amendment enforcement authority when it adopted Section 2’s
discriminatory effects standard. I address each criticism in turn.
A. Race-Based Redistricting
The most straightforward pronouncements of the Court’s
preference for race-blind redistricting are found not in Section 2 cases,
but rather in the Shaw line of cases. In contrast with vote dilution
doctrine, Shaw’s “racial gerrymandering claim does not ask for a fair
share of political power and influence, . . . [but] asks instead for the
elimination of a racial classification.”163 Thus, Shaw claims are

(June 28, 2019, 10:18 AM), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=105855 [https://perma.cc/V5FP-SHS2]
(criticizing the Court for failing to engage with racial vote dilution doctrine).
161. See Cox & Miles, supra note 89, at 2 (noting the criticism that the VRA’s “prohibition of
minority vote dilution [is] a Democratic Party protection provision”); Kang, Democratic
Contestation, supra note 27, at 744–45 (“The close association between African American voters
and Democrats means that representational guarantees for African Americans under the VRA
inevitably produce safe districts for Democrats that are almost completely insulated from partisan
competition.”). This criticism of the VRA was perhaps more forceful when Section 5’s
preclearance requirement was operative, since its retrogression principle generally prohibited a
reduction in the number of majority-minority districts. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 466
(2003).
162. Justice Thomas has long argued that Section 2’s text does not encompass vote dilution
claims. See Holder, 512 U.S. at 922–23 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia
also adhered to this view. See id. at 891. Justice Gorsuch recently concurred with Thomas’s
approach. See Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2335 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). Although
Thomas’s critique is difficult to square with Section 2’s plain language, the 1982 amendments’
legislative history, the VRA’s statutory history, and principles of stare decisis, this statutory
argument is outside the scope of this Article. For a scholarly defense of Section 2’s application to
vote dilution claims, see Lani Guinier, (E)racing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 109, 118–25 (1994).
163. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2502.
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“analytically distinct”164 from—and in doctrinal tension with—vote
dilution doctrine and Section 2’s requirement of race-based
redistricting.
In creating the racial gerrymandering cause of action, the Shaw
Court explained that:
[R]eapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter. A
reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who
belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by
geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in
common with one another but the color of their skin, bears an
uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid. It reinforces the
perception that members of the same racial group . . . think alike,
share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates
at the polls. We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as
impermissible racial stereotypes.165

The Shaw Court proclaimed that race-based redistricting
“balkanize[s] us into competing racial factions”166 and speculated that
“racial gerrymander[ing] may exacerbate the very patterns of racial
bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to
counteract.”167 The Shaw line of cases analogizes the purposeful
creation of majority-minority districts to Jim Crow-style segregation.168
Under Shaw, if “race was the predominant factor”169 in the
creation of a particular district, then that “district must withstand strict
scrutiny.”170 That is, the jurisdiction must “prove that its race-based
sorting of voters serves a ‘compelling interest’ and is ‘narrowly tailored’
164. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 652 (1993); see also Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi,
Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District
Appearances after Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 494 (1993) (“To begin to understand
Shaw, one must first note that vote dilution is not involved in the case. The plaintiffs could not
prove—and the Court acknowledged that they did not allege—vote dilution.”).
165. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647 (emphases added).
166. Id. at 657.
167. Id. at 648; see also ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, VOTING RIGHTS—AND WRONGS: THE
ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIALLY FAIR ELECTIONS 217 (2009) (“Majority-minority districts
appear to reward political actors who consolidate the minority vote by making the sort of overt
racial appeals that are the staple of invidious identity politics.”).
168. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (“Just as the State may not, absent
extraordinary justification, segregate citizens on the basis of race in its public parks, buses, golf
courses, beaches, and schools, so did we recognize in Shaw that it may not separate its citizens
into different voting districts on the basis of race.” (citations omitted)).
169. Id. at 916.
170. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1464 (2017).
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to that end.”171 The Court has “long assumed that complying with the
VRA is a compelling interest”172 but has not given its full blessing that
Section 2 would survive strict scrutiny. As for the narrow-tailoring
prong, the Court has “give[n] States ‘breathing room’ to adopt
reasonable compliance measures that may prove, in perfect hindsight,
not to have been needed.”173 A state can satisfy the narrow-tailoring
requirement if it “establish[es] that it had ‘good reasons’ to think that
it would transgress the [VRA] if it did not draw race-based district
lines.”174 In other words, if the state has a “strong basis in evidence” for
believing that the VRA mandated the creation of a majority-minority
district, it can avoid liability under Shaw.175
Here, it should be emphasized that Shaw does not trigger strict
scrutiny when mapmakers are merely aware of race.176 Rather, the
“plaintiff must prove that the legislature subordinated traditional raceneutral districting principles, including but not limited to compactness,
contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or communities
defined by actual shared interests, to racial considerations.”177 And in
jurisdictions with racial bloc voting, line drawers frequently claim that
partisanship—not race—explains their redistricting choices,178 a
defense that is likely to be raised even more often in the wake of the
Supreme Court’s recent decision holding that partisan gerrymandering
claims are nonjusticiable political questions.179

171. Id. (quoting Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 800 (2017)).
172. Id. at 1469 (emphasis added); see also Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. at 801 (assuming that
compliance with Section 5, when it was operative, was a compelling state interest); Shaw v. Hunt
(Shaw II), 517 U.S. 899, 915 (1996) (assuming that compliance with Section 2 is a compelling
interest).
173. Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1464 (quoting Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. at 802).
174. Id. (quoting Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. 254, 278 (2015)).
175. Id. Defendants in Title VII cases can raise a similar “strong basis in evidence” defense to
a disparate treatment claim. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 584–85 (2009).
176. See Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. at 797.
177. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (emphasis added).
178. See Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1473; see also Hasen, Race or Party, supra note 50, at 1838–39
(discussing this problem and using Cooper as an illustrative example).
179. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–08 (2019); Kristen Clarke & Jon
Greenbaum, Gerrymandering Symposium: The Racial Implications of Yesterday’s Partisan
Gerrymandering Decision, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2019, 2:01 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/
2019/06/gerrymandering-symposium-the-racial-implications-of-todays-partisan-gerrymanderingdecision [https://perma.cc/B84L-64Z4].
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Shaw casts a long shadow over Section 2.180 Indeed, the Shaw
Court’s concerns about the use of race have surfaced even in situations
where race did not predominate in the redistricting process. For
example, Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in Holder v. Hall is the
most forceful criticism of incorporating racial bloc voting into the
Section 2 analysis.181
In Hall, Thomas noted that the “underlying premise” of “every
minority vote dilution claim” is “that the group asserting dilution is not
merely a racial or ethnic group, but a group having distinct political
interests as well.”182 On this point, Thomas directly criticized Gingles’s
requirement that voting be racially polarized.183 According to Thomas,
the premises underlying Gingles “should be repugnant to any nation
that strives for the ideal of a color-blind Constitution.”184 In so
claiming, Thomas recycled many of Shaw’s criticisms and opined that
Section 2’s “drive to segregate political districts by race can only serve
to deepen racial divisions by destroying any need for voters or

180. In the 1990s, Shaw claims were brought by White plaintiffs to dismantle majorityminority districts, but following the 2010 redistricting cycle, Black plaintiffs started bringing Shaw
claims too. See Richard L. Hasen, Racial Gerrymandering’s Questionable Revival, 67 ALA. L.
REV. 365, 365–66 (2015) (discussing Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. 254, 262–70
(2015)). In this second wave of Shaw cases, Black plaintiffs challenged Southern States’ adoption
of strict quotas for the percentage of minority voters in certain districts, purportedly to comply
with Section 5 of the VRA. See Travis Crum, The Prospect of Bailing-in Texas: The Constitutional
Argument for Bail-in, ELECTION L. BLOG (Sept. 16, 2018, 9:43 AM) (noting the differences
between 1990s and 2010s Shaw claims), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=101141 [https://perma.cc/
Y9TK-MXFE].
Scholars and lawyers have debated the salience of this development. According to
Professor Rick Hasen, Shaw’s “racial gerrymandering cause of action has been repurposed for
new partisan warfare in cases in which the vote dilution claim under section 2 is not strong enough
to stand on its own.” Hasen, Race or Party, supra note 50, at 1854. By contrast, prominent voting
rights attorney Dale Ho argues that the 1990s Shaw cases “sought to turn the redistricting process
away from race” whereas the 2010s Shaw cases sought “to root out intentional efforts to
discriminate on the basis of race.” Ho, supra note 146, at 1891–92.
Resolving this debate is a task left for a future article. In any event, because the Court
refuses to acknowledge any distinction between these two waves of Shaw cases, the requirement
that race-based redistricting triggers strict scrutiny means that Section 2 is still in peril.
181. Cf. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 139, at 870 (“Justice Thomas’s concurrence in
Holder is in some ways the most extraordinary voting rights opinion of modern times.”).
182. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 903 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
183. See id. at 903–05.
184. Id. at 905–06.
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candidates to build bridges between racial groups or to form voting
coalitions.”185
These colorblind concerns are not limited to Justice Thomas’s
sometimes idiosyncratic jurisprudence. The Court has repeatedly
interpreted the VRA to narrow its protections, often prompted by
concerns about its use of race.186 Most relevant here, in Bartlett, a
plurality of the Court cautioned against an expansive interpretation of
Section 2, lest race become “unnecessarily infuse[d] . . . into virtually
every redistricting [plan], raising serious constitutional questions.”187
Chief Justice Roberts, moreover, famously described the Court’s vote
dilution jurisprudence as “a sordid business, this divvying us up by
race.”188
Outside the voting rights realm, the Court has repeatedly
questioned—and frequently prohibited—the explicit use of race in
affirmative action programs.189 In a similar vein, the Court has voiced
185. Id. at 907; see also id. (“The ‘black representative’s’ function, in other words, is to
represent the ‘black interest.’” (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 650 (1993))).
186. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 549–50, 557 (2013) (invalidating the VRA’s
coverage formula); Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 211 (2009)
(permitting political subdivisions to bail-out of the VRA’s coverage formula); Georgia v.
Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 482–83 (2003) (allowing influence and coalition districts to count as
majority-minority districts under Section 5’s retrogression analysis); Reno v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd.
(Bossier Parish II), 528 U.S. 320, 341 (2000) (holding that “§ 5 does not prohibit preclearance of
a redistricting plan enacted with a discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose”); Holder, 512
U.S. at 885 (plurality opinion) (concluding that Section 2 could not be used to challenge the size
of a governing body); Presley v. Etowah Cty. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 503–08 (1992) (holding that
rules altering the allocation of power within an elected body are not subject to the VRA’s
preclearance requirement); see also Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer,
Administering Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act After Shelby County, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2143,
2158 (2015) (“The Supreme Court has issued a string of decisions narrowing section 2 on the basis
of the constitutional avoidance canon.”). These decisions were frequently the confluence of
numerous concerns about the VRA’s constitutionality, in particular its federalism costs. See GuyUriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Race, Federalism, and Voting Rights, 2015 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 113, 114 (2015) (“Northwest Austin and Shelby County have thrust federalism into the
heart of voting rights disputes.”); Franita Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalism as a
Constraint on the Voting Rights Act, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1195, 1259 (2012) [hereinafter Tolson,
Reinventing] (criticizing Northwest Austin for relying on a “free-floating federalism norm”).
187. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 21 (2009) (plurality opinion) (quoting League of United
Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 446 (2006) (opinion of Kennedy, J.)).
188. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 511 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
189. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215 (2016) (upholding an
affirmative-action plan but noting “the University’s ongoing obligation to engage in constant
deliberation and continued reflection regarding its admissions policies”); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (invalidating the University of Michigan’s affirmative-action policy for
undergraduate admissions).
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constitutional concerns about the predictable use of race to comply
with the disparate-impact provisions of anti-discrimination laws.190
These decisions all reveal the Court’s deep suspicion of the explicit—
or predictable—consideration of race.191 The Gingles precondition that
plaintiffs must establish racial bloc voting to prevail on a statutory vote
dilution claim is no exception.
B. Private Action
Before delving into the second criticism of the Gingles factors, a
quick primer on state action is helpful. It is well established that the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only state action.192 Given this
limitation, Congress cannot exercise its Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement authority to target private conduct.193 By contrast, it is less
settled whether the state action doctrine applies to the Fifteenth

190. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 543
(2015) (“Courts should avoid interpreting disparate-impact liability to be so expansive as to inject
racial considerations into every housing decision.”); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (predicting that “the Court will have to confront the question: Whether,
or to what extent, are the disparate-impact provisions of [anti-discrimination statutes] consistent
with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection?” (citing Richard A. Primus, Equal
Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493 (2003))).
191. See Issacharoff, Polarized Voting, supra note 21, at 1845.
192. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000) (noting the “time-honored
principle that the Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits only state action”).
193. See id. at 627 (invalidating civil remedies provision of the Violence Against Women Act);
United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 640 (1883) (invalidating Section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of
1871 for being “directed exclusively against the action of private persons, without reference to the
laws of the State”). For a dissenting view on the state action doctrine, see Jack M. Balkin, The
Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801, 1819–21 (2010) [hereinafter Balkin,
Reconstruction].
Rather than rely on the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has invoked its Commerce
Clause authority to regulate discrimination in the economic sphere. See Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294, 305 (1965) (upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act under the Commerce Clause);
Christopher W. Schmidt, Section 5’s Forgotten Years: Congressional Power to Enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment Before Katzenbach v. Morgan, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 47, 73–83 (2018)
(surveying the debate over whether Title II should be defended under the Fourteenth
Amendment or the Commerce Clause). Congress, however, cannot rely on the Commerce Clause
to protect the right to vote free of racial discrimination.
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Amendment194 and, if it does, how broadly.195 This point will be
unpacked more below,196 but suffice it to say that the critics of Gingles
do not parse the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments on this score.
With this background in mind, now for the critique. In a dissenting
opinion, then-Justice Rehnquist asserted that racially polarized voting
was “private rather than governmental discrimination.”197 Thus,
according to Rehnquist, vote dilution “results from bloc voting” and is
not “traceable to the discrimination of governmental bodies.”198
Because private action falls outside the Reconstruction Amendments’
scope, Rehnquist’s argument goes, vote dilution is not a cognizable
injury and thus Congress may not use its enforcement authority to
remedy the effects of racial bloc voting.199 More recently, Justice
Thomas similarly asserted that “racially polarized voting is not
evidence of unconstitutional discrimination [and] is not state action”
while arguing that Section 5’s preclearance provision and coverage
formula were unconstitutional.200 Even though defenders of the VRA
acknowledge that “racially polarized voting alone does not signal a
constitutional violation,”201 Rehnquist and Thomas would simply
ignore racially polarized voting and the schemes that can predictably
dilute minority votes under those conditions.
C. Congress’s Reconstruction Amendment Enforcement Authority
The final critique of the Gingles factors is that Congress exceeded
its enforcement authority when it expanded Section 2 to embrace a
discriminatory effects standard.202

194. See Franita Tolson, The Spectrum of Congressional Authority over Elections, 99 B.U. L.
REV. 317, 337 (2019) [hereinafter Tolson, Spectrum] (“[T]he Court initially enforced the Fifteenth
Amendment against both private individuals and the states . . . [but] later imposed a state action
requirement on the Fifteenth Amendment in 1903.”).
195. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469–70 (1953) (plurality opinion) (concluding that the
Jaybird Association’s exclusion of Black voters from its Democratic Party straw poll qualified as
state action and thus violated the Fifteenth Amendment).
196. See infra Part IV.B.2.
197. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 216–17 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Stewart, the author of the Bolden plurality, joined Rehnquist’s dissent. See id. at 206.
198. Id. at 216.
199. See id. at 216–17.
200. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 228 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
201. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 578 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
202. See supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text.
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In many ways, the enforcement authority argument builds off the
previous two critiques. If the Shaw Court is correct that the Equal
Protection Clause imposes outer limits on race-based redistricting,
then the Gingles factors are constitutionally suspect for injecting race
into the redistricting process and forcing line drawers to determine
whether racial bloc voting exists in their jurisdiction. Under the critics’
view, Gingles’s precondition that voting be racially polarized is an
inappropriate means of remedying racial discrimination in voting. And
if Rehnquist and Thomas are right on the state action issue, then
Congress cannot combat the discriminatory effects of racial bloc
voting, nor can it rely on high rates of racially polarized voting as part
of a legislative record to justify Section 2.
On the enforcement authority question, the distinction between
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments matters significantly.
Recall that the Court has recognized vote dilution claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment but has remained agnostic on whether the
Fifteenth Amendment also encompasses such claims.203 As such, under
current doctrine, Section 2 is arguably best conceptualized as an
exercise of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority, since
Congress would need to justify only its adoption of a discriminatory
effects standard.204 In other words, under the Fourteenth Amendment,
Congress merely abrogated the intent requirement when it revised
Section 2 in 1982. But under the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress may
have needed to proscribe a whole new set of discriminatory voting
practices—namely, dilutive schemes—in addition to eliminating the
intent requirement.205
Presuming that Section 2 should be defended under the
Fourteenth Amendment—rather than the Fifteenth—is fraught with
peril, however. For decades, the Court followed the deferential
203. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
204. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 207 n.1 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(“The Voting Rights Act is generally viewed as an exercise of Fifteenth Amendment power. Since
vote ‘dilution’ devices are in issue in this case, the rights at stake are more properly viewed as
Fourteenth Amendment rights.” (citation omitted)); Elmendorf, Biased Votes, supra note 38, at
401 n.117 (“Section 2 may need the Fourteenth Amendment as its anchor insofar as it reaches
injuries beyond simple vote denial, as it remains disputed whether the Fifteenth Amendment goes
any further.”).
205. Throughout this Article, I assume arguendo that the Fifteenth Amendment has an intent
requirement. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (plurality opinion). That said,
many of the arguments pertaining to the word “abridge” are applicable to whether the Fifteenth
Amendment covers discriminatory effects. See infra Part IV.B.1.
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rationality standard articulated in Katzenbach v. Morgan206 and South
Carolina v. Katzenbach207 to review legislation passed pursuant to
Congress’s Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment enforcement
authority.208 In those decisions, the Court held that “[a]s against the
reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means to
effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in
voting.”209 And under the Katzenbach standard, the Court also gave
Congress leeway to independently interpret the Reconstruction
Amendments.210 The Katzenbach standard is thus “a broad statement
of congressional authority in relation to both the powers of the states
and the Court.”211
But in City of Boerne v. Flores,212 the Court significantly curbed
Congress’s interpretive and remedial authority under the Fourteenth
Amendment.213 At the first step of Boerne’s congruence and
proportionality test, the Court “identif[ies] with some precision the
scope of the constitutional right at issue.”214 The Court then examines
the legislative record to ascertain “whether Congress identified a
history and pattern of unconstitutional [conduct] by the States.”215 And
at the final step, the Court determines whether “[t]here [is] a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end.”216 Because the Boerne
Court arrogated to itself the sole responsibility of interpreting the
Constitution and required a much tighter fit between the evil to be

206. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
207. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
208. See Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing Representation: Congressional Power To Enforce the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2341,
2365–74 (2003) [hereinafter Katz, Reinforcing Representation] (surveying several decisions
applying Katzenbach’s rationality standard).
209. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324 (emphasis added).
210. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648; see also Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and
Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 184 (1997)
[hereinafter McConnell, Institutions] (noting that, under Katzenbach, the question is “whether
the congressional interpretation is within a reasonable range of plausible interpretations—not
whether it is the same as the Supreme Court’s”).
211. Crum, Superfluous, supra note 25, at 1571 (footnotes omitted).
212. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
213. See id. at 519; Katz, Reinforcing Representation, supra note 208, at 2395.
214. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001).
215. Id. at 368.
216. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
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remedied and the means employed,217 several commentators have
questioned whether a post-Boerne Court would uphold the VRA as an
appropriate exercise of Congress’s Reconstruction Amendment
enforcement authority.218
It remains an open question whether Boerne applies to Congress’s
Fifteenth Amendment enforcement authority,219 a point discussed
more below.220 Because the above-referenced critiques are more
forceful under Boerne than Katzenbach, the answer to that question
may determine Section 2’s constitutionality.
III. RACIALLY POLARIZED VOTING DURING RECONSTRUCTION
Racially polarized voting is not a modern phenomenon. In fact,
the relevant starting point is the 1860s, not the 1960s. Contrary to what
contemporary doctrine dictates,221 the Fourteenth Amendment did not
enfranchise any Black citizens during Reconstruction.222 The
Reconstruction Framers differentiated between civil and political
rights and did not equate citizenship with suffrage.223 This latter point

217. See Katz, Reinforcing Representation, supra note 208, at 2362–68; Robert C. Post & Reva
B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and
Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 444–45 (2000). To be sure, under Boerne, the Court “appear[s] to give
Congress even greater latitude to craft remedial legislation in areas of traditional equal protection
strict scrutiny.” Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own
Success?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1715 (2004); see also Crum, Pocket Trigger, supra note 133,
at 2022 (describing Boerne as having “a built-in sliding scale”). Thus, it is possible the Court may
be more deferential in reviewing Section 2 because Congress has legislated on the topics of race
and voting.
218. See, e.g., Gerken, Undiluted Vote, supra note 5, at 1736–37; Karlan, Two Section Twos,
supra note 106, at 725–26.
219. See, e.g., Tolson, Spectrum, supra note 194, at 337.
220. See infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing Boerne and Shelby County).
221. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) (applying the Fourteenth
Amendment to intentionally discriminatory vote denial laws); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536,
541 (1927) (similar).
222. See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 25, at 1602 & n.362 (explaining that seventeen States
prohibited Black suffrage even after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification).
223. The Reconstruction debates were “based on a tripartite division of rights, universally
accepted at the time but forgotten today, between civil rights, political rights, and social rights.”
Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1016
(1995) [hereinafter McConnell, Desegregation]; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 382 (2005) [hereinafter AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION]
(observing that the right to vote “lay outside the domain of mere citizenship”); Amar &
Brownstein, supra note 25, at 929 (“[T]he drafters of the Reconstruction Amendments viewed
political rights as qualitatively different from civil rights . . . .”).
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is underscored by the disenfranchisement of women, who were treated
as second-class citizens who could exercise civil rights but not political
rights.224 Based on this rights framework, the Reconstruction Framers
designed the Fourteenth Amendment to exclude protections for
political rights225 because they feared that inclusion of Black suffrage
in the Amendment would doom its ratification.226 “Even Republicans
who favored black suffrage acknowledged that they lacked the votes to
secure it” in the Fourteenth Amendment.227
In this Part, I discuss the role of racially polarized voting during
Reconstruction, both in the early days of Black suffrage in the South
and in the lead-up to the Fifteenth Amendment’s passage and
ratification.
A. Racially Polarized Voting Before the Fifteenth Amendment
Prior to the Fifteenth Amendment’s passage in 1869 and
ratification in 1870,228 Black suffrage was already part of our nation’s
political life—just not nationwide.229 Several Northern and Midwestern

224. See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 223, at 382.
225. See, e.g., Amar & Brownstein, supra note 25, at 928 (“The framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not intend its Equal Protection, Due Process, and Privileges and Immunities
Clauses to interfere with state regulation of political rights.”); McConnell, Desegregation, supra
note 223, at 1024 (“It was generally understood that the nondiscrimination requirement of the
Fourteenth Amendment applied only to ‘civil rights.’ Political and social rights, it was agreed,
were not civil rights and were not protected.”); David A. Strauss, Foreword: Does the Constitution
Mean What It Says?, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1, 38 (2015) (“[A] straightforward reading of the text
makes it clear that the Equal Protection Clause does not require equality in voting.”). But see
Franita Tolson, What is Abridgment?: A Critique of Two Section Twos, 67 ALA. L. REV. 433, 458
(2015) [hereinafter Tolson, Abridgment] (“Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was the
Reconstruction Congress’s attempt to constitutionalize a mechanism that would allow Congress
to all but legislate universal suffrage . . . .”).
226. See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 223, at 392–93 (“Moderate
Republicans feared they could not sell the equal-suffrage idea in the North, where white bigotry
remained a stubborn fact of life.”); McConnell, Desegregation, supra note 223, at 1106 (“In 1866,
the Radicals were unable to secure enough votes to guarantee black political rights in the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”).
227. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 28 (2004); see also ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:
AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 260 (1988) (“The [Fourteenth]
Amendment supplied Republicans with a platform for the [1866] campaign, while leaving to the
future the issue of black suffrage.”).
228. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1563 (1869) (passage in the House); id. at 1641
(passage in the Senate); 16 Stat. 1131–32 (1870) (ratification).
229. For an overview of the expansion of Black suffrage before the Fifteenth Amendment,
see Crum, Superfluous, supra note 25, at 1593–97.
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States had already extended the franchise to Black men.230 In 1867,
Congress enacted a series of laws to enfranchise Black men in areas of
federal control. Congress first enfranchised Black men in the District
of Columbia231 and the federal territories.232 Congress also required
Nebraska to enfranchise Black citizens as a “fundamental condition”
of its admission to the Union.233 And, most importantly, Congress
passed the First Reconstruction Act, which imposed Black suffrage on
ten of the eleven ex–Confederate States and compelled them to hold
new constitutional conventions chosen with an all-male electorate.234
In a similar vein, Congress adopted two fundamental conditions for
these Southern States’ readmission to the Union: that they never
amend their state constitutions to disenfranchise Black citizens and
that they ratify the Fourteenth Amendment.235
The plight of the freedmen motivated Congress to enfranchise
Black southern men for several reasons.236 First, the postwar southern
governments quickly demonstrated that they could not be trusted to

230. See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 223, 610 n.88 (noting that Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont all permitted Black suffrage by the
end of the Civil War); GILLETTE, supra note 33, at 26–27 (stating that voters in Iowa and
Minnesota endorsed Black suffrage in referenda in 1868 and that the Wisconsin Supreme Court
issued a ruling enfranchising Black citizens in 1866).
231. See An Act To Regulate the Elective Franchise in the District of Columbia, ch. 6, 14 Stat.
375 (1867).
232. See An Act To Regulate the Elective Franchise in the Territories of the United States,
ch. 15, 14 Stat. 379 (1867).
233. See An Act for the Admission of the Territory of Nebraska into the Union, ch. 36, 14
Stat. 391 (1867). During Reconstruction, the use of fundamental conditions for admission was
controversial, even among Republicans. See EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869, at 127 (1990) (discussing Republican opposition to
“the idea that Congress could set suffrage-related conditions for admission to statehood that
would bind erstwhile territories after the admission process was completed”); Thomas B. Colby,
In Defense of the Equal Sovereignty Principle, 65 DUKE L.J. 1087, 1163–64 (2016) (noting doubts
about the validity of fundamental conditions).
234. See First Reconstruction Act, ch. 153, § 5, 14 Stat. 428, 429 (1867) (requiring ten ex–
Confederate States to enfranchise male citizens over twenty-one years of age, regardless of “race,
color, or previous condition”). The one Confederate State left out of the First Reconstruction Act
was Tennessee, which enacted legislation enfranchising Black citizens in February 1867 after its
readmission to the Union. See W.E. BURGHARDT DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN
AMERICA, 1860-1880, at 575 (2d ed. 1962).
235. See JOHN MABRY MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE
FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 18 (1909).
236. Congress relied on the Guarantee Clause as its source of authority to enfranchise Black
citizens in the Reconstructed South. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; AMAR, AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTION, supra note 223, at 374–75.
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protect the freedmen.237 The Southern States enacted the notorious
Black Codes, which attempted to reestablish a system of de facto
slavery via strict vagrancy and labor-contract laws.238 In addition, the
Southern States—with the exception of Tennessee—initially rejected
the Fourteenth Amendment by huge margins.239 Congress attributed
these decisions to the recalcitrance of the all-White southern
electorate.240 Second, and relatedly, the postwar southern governments
were dubiously loyal to the Union. Although the South generally sent
Unionists to Congress, their hold on power was tenuous, as prominent
Confederates came close to winning several elections and lesser-known
rebels occupied lower posts.241 And third, the abolition of slavery
meant that the Constitution’s infamous Three-Fifths Clause would no
longer result in Black people being undercounted for apportionment
purposes. The perverse upshot was that the Southern States would
increase their share of seats in the House of Representatives—and
concomitantly in the Electoral College—even though Black
southerners remained disenfranchised.242 Despite losing the Civil War,
White southerners’ political power would have been amplified at the
federal level.
Faced with these problems, the Reconstruction Framers turned to
Black suffrage, predicting that Black voters would support the
Republican Party and that empowering these voters would help
transform the South.243 Upon reflection, the reasons for racial bloc
237. See Gabriel J. Chin, The Voting Rights Act of 1867: The Constitutionality of Federal
Regulation of Suffrage During Reconstruction, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1581, 1590 (2004).
238. FONER, supra note 227, at 198–201. Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in
direct response to the Black Codes. See id. at 244.
239. See 1 HANES WALTON, JR., SHERMAN C. PUCKETT & DONALD R. DESKINS, JR., THE
AFRICAN AMERICAN ELECTORATE: A STATISTICAL HISTORY 235 tbl.13.2 (2012).
240. See id. at 235.
241. See FONER, supra note 227, at 196–97. Some prominent rebels were placed in positions
of power. Georgia, for example, appointed former Confederate Vice President Alexander
Hamilton Stephens to the U.S. Senate. Id. at 196.
242. See Chin, supra note 237, at 1589–90. Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment also
addressed this problem by reducing a state’s seats in the House of Representatives if it “denied”
or “abridged” the “right to vote” of its adult “male” “citizens.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; see
also Pamela S. Karlan, Reapportionment, Nonapportionment, and Recovering Some Lost History
of One Person, One Vote, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1921, 1931 (2018) (discussing the rationale
behind Section Two). Section Two has never been enforced. Gerard N. Magliocca, Our
Unconstitutional Reapportionment Process, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 774, 783 (2018).
243. See MALTZ, supra note 233, at 132 (characterizing Black southerners as a “loyal
counterweight to the potential political power of the rebellious whites”); Amar & Brownstein,
supra note 25, at 939 (“Republicans anticipated that the black populations in the South would be
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voting during Reconstruction are quickly apparent. Between 1860 and
1868, the Republican Party abolished slavery,244 supported and won the
Civil War,245 militarily occupied the South,246 passed the Freedmen’s
Bureau Bill and the Civil Rights Act of 1866,247 and adopted two
constitutional amendments that protected the civil rights of Black
people.248 The Republican Party also enfranchised Black men across
the South249 and advocated Black suffrage at the state level in the
North.250
By contrast, the Democratic Party represented the old slave order
and aligned itself with unabashed racists.251 Democrats vehemently
opposed Black suffrage for racist and partisan reasons, predicting that
Black voters would support Republicans.252 These White supremacist
beliefs revealed themselves in other policy areas: no Democrat in
either house of Congress voted for the Civil Rights Act of 1866 or the
Fourteenth Amendment.253
under siege and believed that political influence and voting power would be their sole means of
defense.”); id. at 943 (“New black voters were expected to vote Republican . . . .”).
244. See FONER, supra note 227, at 2–3 (emphasizing the significance of the abolitionist
movement and the Emancipation Proclamation); id. at 66–67 (discussing the ratification of the
Thirteenth Amendment).
245. Black soldiers were an essential part of the Union’s war effort. See id. at 8 (“By the war’s
end, some 180,000 blacks had served in the Union Army—over one fifth of the nation’s adult male
black population under age forty-five.”); MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE FIGHT TO VOTE 61 (2016)
(noting that Black soldiers accounted for ten percent of the Union army). Black soldiers’ military
service was frequently invoked to justify the extension of suffrage. See Amar & Brownstein, supra
note 25, at 932.
246. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (discussing First Reconstruction Act).
247. See FONER, supra note 227, at 247–50.
248. See AMAR, UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 24, at 398–400 (detailing Republican
support for the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments).
249. See supra note 233–234 and accompanying text.
250. See GILLETTE, supra note 33, at 25–27.
251. See, e.g., FONER, supra note 227, at 293 (“[B]lacks identified the old [Democratic]
political leaders with slavery.”); id. at 340–41 (discussing the Democratic Party’s racial appeals in
the 1868 campaign); Amar & Brownstein, supra note 25, at 946 (“Democrats’ opposition to black
suffrage would certainly have cemented the allegiance of the new voters to the party of Lincoln.”).
To provide just one example of the racism espoused by Democratic politicians, a Democratic
senator stated during the debate over the Fifteenth Amendment that, “[w]hile the white man for
two thousand years past has been going upward and onward, the negro race wherever found
dependent upon himself has been going downward or standing still.” CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong.,
3d Sess. 989 (1869) (statement of Sen. Hendricks).
252. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 25, at 947–48.
253. J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING
OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 39 tbl.1.2 (1999). Even beyond issues of race and civil rights,
there was less ideological overlap between political parties in the nineteenth century than in the
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In light of these divergent worldviews, the Reconstruction
Framers’ political predictions proved prescient.254 But to fully
appreciate the impact of the First Reconstruction Act, it is useful to
consider the country’s racial demographics during Reconstruction.
Given slavery’s labor-intensive nature and the fact that many Northern
States prohibited Black migration prior to the Civil War,255 Black
people were heavily concentrated in the South. Three Southern
States—Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina—were majority
Black. In addition, Black people were above 45 percent of the
population in Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, and around 40 percent
in North Carolina and Virginia. Black people were about a quarter of
the population in Arkansas and Texas.256 Between 1866 and 1867, the
percentage of the nation’s Black men that could vote went from 0.5
percent to 80.5 percent,257 a massive increase largely attributable to the
First Reconstruction Act.258
Black voters thus constituted effective voting majorities in five
Southern States—Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South

twentieth century. See Kang, Hyperpartisan Gerrymandering, supra note 24, at 1393–94
(describing the mid- to late-nineteenth century as an era of extreme partisanship in Congress).
254. These predictions were not uniformly shared. At the dawn of Reconstruction, some
southerners—including avowed racist President Andrew Johnson—believed that the freedmen
would “vote with their former owners.” FONER, supra note 227, at 186.
255. See LAURA F. EDWARDS, A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION 83 (2015) (noting that Black people were denied entry to several Midwestern
States).
256. See FONER, supra note 227, at 294; see also AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra
note 223, at 374 (providing similar figures but estimating that Black people were just shy of a
majority in Louisiana).
257. RICHARD M. VALELLY, THE TWO RECONSTRUCTIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK
ENFRANCHISEMENT 24 (2004).
258. During Reconstruction, Black people represented 12.7 percent of the population.
See GILLETTE, supra note 33, at 82 tbl.1 (providing statistics for 1870). That figure is
comparable to today’s 13.4 percent. Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/fact/table/US/RHI225218 [https://perma.cc/358E-DUJZ]. However, compared to
Reconstruction, Black people are now less concentrated in the South. See SONYA RASTOGI,
TALLESE D. JOHNSON, ELIZABETH M. HOEFFEL & MALCOM P. DREWERY, JR., U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, THE BLACK POPULATION: 2010, at 7 (2011), https://www.census.gov/prod/
cen2010/briefs/c2010br-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/RB82-RDPX] (finding that 55 percent of Black
people live in the South); id. at 9 (finding that California, Illinois, Ohio, and New York have
substantial Black populations). And unlike during Reconstruction, there are currently no
majority-Black States. See id. at 8 tbl.5. Four States, however, are majority-minority. See 2010
Census Shows America’s Diversity, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 24, 2011),
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/cb11-cn125.html [https://perma.cc/
D8Z5-NJ6K] (listing California, Hawaii, New Mexico, and Texas).
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Carolina—given
their
high
registration
rates
and
the
disenfranchisement of ex-Confederates pursuant to the First
Reconstruction Act.259 And these were not slim majorities. In 1867,
Black men were over 60 percent of registered voters in Alabama,
Louisiana, and South Carolina.260 Looking at the South as a whole,
Black registered voters outpaced White registered voters by a wide
margin.261
These newly empowered Black voters quickly reshaped southern
and national politics in the multiracial elections that occurred prior to
the Fifteenth Amendment—namely, the 1867–68 elections associated
with the southern constitutional conventions, which were mandated by
the First Reconstruction Act, as well as the 1868 general election. Black
voters demonstrated their strong support for the Republican Party and
its agenda.
In the southern state-level elections, Black voters decisively
backed the new constitutional conventions. Across the South, Black
voters accounted for between 66 percent and 97 percent of the votes in
favor of the constitutional conventions.262 And in a remarkable degree
of unanimity, not a single Black voter cast a ballot against the
constitutional conventions in Alabama, Florida, North Carolina, and
South Carolina.263 Black turnout was also high, ranging from 70 percent
to nearly 90 percent.264 Furthermore, for the first time in our nation’s
history, Black politicians were elected to office,265 though not in
proportion to their percentage of the population.266 Republicans

259. See FONER, supra note 227, at 294 n.27; VALELLY, supra note 257, at 32–33 tbl.2.1; see
also WALTON ET AL., supra note 239, at 244 tbl.13.7 (showing that over 47,000 ex-Confederates
were disenfranchised in Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia).
260. See WALTON ET AL., supra note 239, at 239 tbl.13.3.
261. The scholarly estimates vary somewhat. See VALELLY, supra note 257, at 32 (reporting
a 703,000 to 627,000 Black–White registration gap); WALTON ET AL., supra note 239, at 246
tbl.13.9 (highlighting a 772,850 to 727,424 Black–White registration gap); Xi Wang, Black Suffrage
and the Redefinition of American Freedom, 1860-1870, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 2153, 2213 (1996)
[hereinafter Wang, Black Suffrage] (pointing to a 735,000 to 635,000 Black–White registration
gap). Black voters also outnumbered White voters in several southern cities. See HOWARD N.
RABINOWITZ, RACE RELATIONS IN THE URBAN SOUTH, 1865-1890, at 264 (1978).
262. See WALTON ET AL., supra note 239, at 241 fig.13.2.
263. See id. at 241.
264. See FONER, supra note 227, at 314.
265. Id. at 316.
266. See id. at 318 (showing that Black officials were underrepresented in most States). But
see DU BOIS, supra note 234, at 372 (showing that Black delegates accounted for 61 percent, 50
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controlled the new southern governments formed by these
conventions267 and quickly ratified the Fourteenth Amendment,
helping it get over Article V’s three-fourths hurdle.268
At the federal level, the 1868 election results vividly demonstrated
the importance of Black voters to Republican electoral success.
President Grant’s slim popular-vote victory—300,000 out of 5.7 million
votes—was attributed to the support of 500,000 Black voters, mostly in
the South.269 Moreover, due to Black voters’ support, Grant won every
readmitted ex–Confederate State except Georgia and Louisiana,
where Klan violence suppressed the Black vote.270 The southern Black
voting bloc also elected 250 Black state legislators in 1868.271
Conversely, White southerners generally opposed the
constitutional conventions and voted for Democrats.272 But to be clear,
White southerners were not uniformly Democrats. Those White
southerners who remained loyal to the Union—alternatively called
Unionists or scalawags, depending on the speaker’s viewpoint—tended
to vote Republican.273 And White northerners who moved to the South
during Reconstruction—known as carpetbaggers—supported the
Republican Party.274 White Republicans in the South, however, lacked
the numbers to exercise real political power and needed the help of
Black voters to win elections.275 The alliance between Black and White
Republicans was sometimes fraught. Many Unionists, for example,

percent, and 40 percent of delegates at the South Carolina, Louisiana, and Florida conventions,
respectively).
267. See RICHARD H. ABBOTT, THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND THE SOUTH, 1855-1877, at
108, 164 (1986).
268. See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 25, at 197–98, 211.
269. See id. at 236; Wang, Black Suffrage, supra note 261, at 2214–15.
270. See RON CHERNOW, GRANT 623 (2017).
271. See KOUSSER, supra note 253, at 19 fig.1.1. Throughout Reconstruction, several Black
officials served on the city councils in Atlanta, Montgomery, Nashville, and Raleigh.
RABINOWITZ, supra note 261, at 265.
272. See FONER, supra note 227, at 297 (“In no Southern state did Republicans attract a
majority of the white vote.”); WALTON ET AL., supra note 239, at 240 tbl.13.4 (showing White
voters’ support for the constitutional conventions ranging from 8.5 percent to 33.6 percent).
273. See FONER, supra note 227, at 294 (discussing scalawags); id. at 300 (“The most extensive
concentration of white Republicans . . . lay in the upcountry bastions of wartime Unionism.”).
274. See id. at 294–95.
275. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 25, at 942 (“Loyal white Unionists in the South,
acting alone, lacked the ability to protect themselves. They certainly did not have the power to
transform the region. Republicans believed that, together, newly freed black men and loyal whites
could wrest governmental authority from rebel leadership.”).
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were “reluctan[t] . . . to vote for black candidates,” meaning that most
Black officials were elected from overwhelmingly Black districts
located in former plantation areas.276 Overall, Black voters almost
uniformly supported the Republican Party whereas White southerners
leaned Democratic.277
The reality of racially polarized voting was known during
Reconstruction—and known by Congress.278 Of course, there were
obvious reasons for partisan divides along racial lines and the election
results spoke for themselves. But critically, the House and the Senate
each commissioned reports on voter turnout and registration rates in
the southern constitutional convention elections.279 The Senate Report
even catalogued these statistics by race and identified the number of
White and Black men voting for and against the constitutional
conventions.280 This data collection was possible because voting was
not yet by secret ballot281 and the Union Army—tasked with keeping
an uneasy peace in the South—adopted a policy of using different lines
and registrars for Black and White voters in many southern
jurisdictions.282
B. Racially Polarized Voting and the Fifteenth Amendment
These election results were not lost on the Reconstruction
Framers, who candidly recognized the role of racial bloc voting in
debating the Fifteenth Amendment. As in any group decision-making
process,283 the Reconstruction Framers had numerous reasons for
advocating nationwide Black suffrage when the lame-duck Fortieth

276. FONER, supra note 227, at 355; see also id. at 331 (noting that Black voters’ “very
unanimity as Republicans meant their ballots could be taken for granted by party leaders seeking
the white vote”); SARAH WOOLFOLK WIGGINS, THE SCALAWAG IN ALABAMA POLITICS, 1865–
1881, at 71 (1977) (attributing Unionist defections in Alabama in 1870 to the presence of a Black
candidate running statewide).
277. To be sure, there were some Black Democrats. See FONER, supra note 227, at 291 (“The
few black Democrats (mostly individuals dependent for a livelihood on white patronage) were
considered ‘enemies to our people.’”).
278. See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 223, at 397–98.
279. See WALTON ET AL., supra note 239, at 237–40.
280. See id. at 237.
281. See Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 224 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“Voting was public until 1888 when the States began to adopt the Australian secret ballot.”).
282. See WALTON ET AL., supra note 239, at 240.
283. Cf. Ryan D. Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DUKE L.J. 979, 981–
82 (2017) (noting the “common refrain” that “Congress is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it’”).
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Congress convened in early 1869. The goal here is not to demonstrate
which motive was primary but rather to show that racial bloc voting
was a widely shared and openly acknowledged assumption motivating
the Fifteenth Amendment’s passage.
On the ideological front, many Radical Republicans started their
careers as abolitionists and viewed Black suffrage as the next logical
step in that struggle.284 Most relevant here, these Radicals believed that
the right to vote would empower Black citizens to mobilize politically
and defend their own interests. As Senator Edmund Ross (R-KS)
eloquently stated, “[t]he ballot is as much the bulwark of liberty to the
black man as it is to the white.”285 Or as Frederick Douglass would later
put it: “What does this fifteenth amendment mean to us? I will tell you.
It means that the colored people are now and will be held to be, by the
whole nation, responsible for their own existence and their well or ill
being.”286
Undergirding this theory was the explicit belief that Black and
White southerners had starkly divergent interests. Senator Henry
Corbett (R-OR), for example, stated that Black voters were “pretty
much the only people in those States who were loyal” and that the
ballot would allow them to “protect themselves in the southern
reconstructed States.”287 This view was widely shared in the Republican
caucus in light of the Black Codes passed in the early days of
Reconstruction and the virulent racism of the Democratic Party.288 The
racial bloc voting in the 1868 election further reinforced this point.289

284. See FONER, supra note 227, at 448.
285. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 983 (1869) (statement of Sen. Ross); see also id. (“No
class, no race is truly free until it is clothed with political power sufficient to make it the peer of
its kindred class or race and enable it to resist the contingencies of popular commotion.”).
286. XI WANG, THE TRIAL OF DEMOCRACY: BLACK SUFFRAGE & NORTHERN
REPUBLICANS, 1860-1910, at 51 (1997) (quoting a speech by Frederick Douglass).
287. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1008 (1869) (statement of Sen. Corbett).
288. See id. at 983 (statement of Sen. Ross) (“The only sure protection of this nation against
the ultimate reestablishment of that [peculiar] institution, is by the adoption and rigid
maintenance in all the States of the doctrine of impartial suffrage.”); id. at 693 (statement of Rep.
Shanks) (“No man is safe in his person or property in a community where he has no voice in the
protection of either.”); MALTZ, supra note 233, at 132 (observing that Republicans viewed Black
southerners as a “loyal counterweight to the potential political power of the rebellious whites”);
Amar & Brownstein, supra note 25, at 939 (arguing that the Reconstruction Framers believed
that “black people needed the right to vote in order to be able to protect themselves against the
enactment of pernicious laws by white southerners”).
289. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 983 (1869) (statement of Sen. Ross) (“The
history of the last presidential canvass ought to be a warning to prompt and decisive action.”).
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Thus, the Republicans’ ideological argument hinged on an
empowerment philosophy: the ballot would give Black people the
means to participate in the political arena and thereby protect their
own interests.290 Or, to foreshadow the Supreme Court’s often-cited
formulation, Republicans believed that the right to vote is
“preservative of all rights.”291
On the partisan front, the Reconstruction Framers recognized that
nationwide Black suffrage would unlock a large Republican-leaning
voting bloc.292 By 1869, Black men could vote in only seventeen of the
thirty-four states.293 Even though the vast majority of Black men in the
nation had already been enfranchised by the First Reconstruction
Act,294 it was estimated at the time that 150,000 Black men would be
enfranchised by the Fifteenth Amendment.295 Many of these potential
Black voters lived in the four Border States—Delaware, Kentucky,
Maryland, and Missouri—which had sizable Black populations due to
their recent history as Slave States.296 And in other closely divided
Northern States—namely, Connecticut, New Jersey, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania—the influx of reliably Republican Black voters was
expected to tip certain elections.297
Responding to concerns that nationwide Black suffrage would
alienate White people and cost Republicans votes, Representative
George Boutwell (R-MA), who introduced the Fifteenth Amendment
in the House,298 declared:
There are one hundred and fifty thousand citizens of the United
States who by this bill will be entitled to the elective franchise but who
are now disfranchised—seventeen hundred in Connecticut, ten

290. Cf. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723–28
(1985) (arguing that discrete and insular minorities have advantages within the political system).
291. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1,
17 (1964) (“Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.”).
292. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 25, at 943–46 (highlighting the Reconstruction
Framers’ vehement belief that Black voters would support the Republican party).
293. See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 25, at 1602 & n.362.
294. See VALELLY, supra note 257, at 24.
295. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 561 (1869) (statement of Rep. Boutwell)
(reporting the estimated number of newly-enfranchised Black voters in different states).
296. Black people represented the following percentages of the population in these States:
Delaware (18.2 percent); Kentucky (16.8 percent); Maryland (22.5 percent); and Missouri (6.9
percent). GILLETTE, supra note 33, at 82 tbl.1.
297. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 25, at 945 n.84.
298. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 285 (1869).
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thousand in New York, five thousand in New Jersey, fourteen
thousand in Pennsylvania, seven thousand in Ohio, twenty-four
thousand in Missouri, forty-five thousand in Kentucky, four thousand
in Delaware, thirty-five thousand in Maryland—who will rally to the
support of this constitutional amendment if by the law they are
enfranchised.299

Senator Charles Sumner (R-MA), one of the most prominent and
persistent Radicals in Congress,300 echoed this sentiment in promoting
Black suffrage:
You need votes in Connecticut, do you not? There are three thousand
fellow-citizens in that State ready at the call of Congress to take their
place at the ballot-box. You need them also in Pennsylvania, do you
not? There are at least fifteen thousand in that great State waiting for
your summons. Where you most need them, there they are; and be
assured they will all vote for those who stand by them in the assertion
of Equal Rights.301

Suffice it to say, it was widely assumed during Reconstruction that
newly enfranchised Black voters would support the Republican
Party.302 Thus, not only was racially polarized voting known during
Reconstruction, but the Reconstruction Framers deliberately
capitalized on it. As Boutwell and Sumner made abundantly clear, the
Republican Party knew it was expanding its voter base when it enacted
the Fifteenth Amendment. This does not denigrate the Republicans’
intentions. Rather, it explains their motivation. Like their ideological
goals, the Radicals’ self-interested argument hinged on an
299. Id. at 561 (statement of Rep. Boutwell). Boutwell made this statement during a debate
over whether nationwide Black suffrage should be achieved via federal statute or constitutional
amendment. For more on this debate, see Crum, Superfluous, supra note 25, at 1604–16.
300. See McConnell, Desegregation, supra note 223, at 987.
301. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 904 (1869) (statement of Sen. Sumner); see also
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 614 (1867) (statement of Sen. Sumner) (raising a similar
point). It is unclear why Boutwell and Sumner had different estimates of the Black populations
of Connecticut and Pennsylvania.
302. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 724 (1869) (statement of Rep. Ward)
(estimating that 250,000 Black people were disenfranchised in the Border States and that 600,000
Black people were disenfranchised in the North); AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note
223, at 397 (“[T]his infusion of new voters might give Republicans extra electoral security in the
coming years.”); GILLETTE, supra note 33, at 113 (“In New Jersey 4,200 potential Negro voters
might well overturn an 1868 Democratic presidential majority of 2,800.”). Republicans also
recognized that some White voters may become alienated by nationwide Black suffrage but
expected that such defections would be outweighed by new Black voters. See AMAR, AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTION, supra note 223, at 398.
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empowerment philosophy: the right to vote would allow Black voters
to mobilize and support the Republican Party, which, in turn, would
protect their interests.
Racially polarized voting, moreover, was critical to the Fifteenth
Amendment’s ratification. All ten states that Congress put under
military Reconstruction ratified the Fifteenth Amendment,303 though
Congress compelled ratification by four of those states as a
fundamental condition for their readmission to the Union.304 The
Southern States were thus instrumental in pushing the Fifteenth
Amendment over Article V’s three-fourths requirement for
ratification—a threshold that would not have been reached but for the
southern Black electorate.305
Republicans also recognized that the Fifteenth Amendment was
necessary for Congress to protect Black southerners in the future,
further evidencing the party’s belief that racially polarized voting
would persist. Recall that the Reconstruction Congress conditioned
the readmittance of ten Southern States on their inclusion of Black
suffrage in their state constitutions.306 But as the Southern States rejoined the Union, there was considerable uncertainty as to whether
Congress possessed constitutional authority to protect Black voters. As
an initial matter, Democrats asserted—and some Republicans
agreed—that fundamental conditions violated the equality of the
states.307 Even setting aside that problem, the consensus view was that
the Fourteenth Amendment did not protect political rights.308 As such,
Congress was left without options for revising voter qualifications of
the readmitted Southern States.309 The Fifteenth Amendment

303. See First Reconstruction Act, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867); GILLETTE, supra note 33, at
84–85 tbl.2.
304. Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia were all required to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment as
part of their readmission to the Union. See GILLETTE, supra note 33, at 100–01. Georgia was
required to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment for its second readmission to the Union. See id. at
84–85 tbl.2 & 101–03.
305. See id. at 84–85 tbl.2; Chin, supra note 237, at 1587–88.
306. See supra notes 233–35 and accompanying text.
307. See Colby, supra note 233, at 1162–64; cf. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557
(2013) (striking down the VRA’s coverage formula as violative of the equal sovereignty
principle).
308. See supra notes 222–27 and accompanying text.
309. Congress could have stripped backsliding states of their seats in the House under Section
Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, but that provision has never been enforced. See supra note
242.
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therefore significantly expanded “congressional authority to regulate
voting rights in the states” and sought to ensure that Black men would
not be disenfranchised after the Southern States re-joined the Union.310
Tragically, the Fifteenth Amendment would prove insufficient to
protect the rights of Black voters. It is well-known that violence, fraud,
and outright disenfranchisement helped establish Jim Crow, but
dilutive schemes and gerrymandering also played a significant role in
its creation.311 Toward the end of Reconstruction, “Mississippi
Redeemers concentrated the bulk of the black population in a
‘shoestring’ Congressional district running the length of the Mississippi
River, leaving five others with white majorities.”312 Other Southern
States followed suit and drew gerrymandered congressional districts to
reduce Black political power.313 Similar dilutive schemes were also
enacted at the state and local level.314 Like all dilutive tactics, these
Redemption-era gerrymanders relied on racially polarized voting to
diminish minority voting power. Thus, racially polarized voting was not
only a central motivating factor in the Fifteenth Amendment’s passage
but was also exploited to dilute minority political power at the end of
Reconstruction.
This evidence clearly demonstrates that Black citizens voted as a
near-uniform bloc for Republicans, that White southerners leaned
heavily in favor of the Democratic Party, and that these political
realities were acknowledged and well-known during Reconstruction.
The Fifteenth Amendment attempted to address the root cause of the

310.
311.
312.
313.

Crum, Superfluous, supra note 25, at 1621 (emphasis omitted).
See FONER, supra note 227, at 590.
Id.
See JOSEPH H. CARTWRIGHT, THE TRIUMPH OF JIM CROW: TENNESSEE RACE
RELATIONS IN THE 1880S, at 223 (1976) (discussing gerrymander of Tennessee congressional
district); KOUSSER, supra note 253, at 26–31 (discussing gerrymanders of congressional districts
in North Carolina, Mississippi, and South Carolina). For a series of helpful color-coded maps
showing how gerrymandering at the end of Reconstruction shifted political power to the
Democrats, see KENNETH C. MARTIS, THE HISTORICAL ATLAS OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE
UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 1789-1989, at 123–31 (1989).
314. See CARTWRIGHT, supra note 313, at 158 (describing the 1889 redistricting of
Chattanooga that packed Black voters into two of eight districts); FONER, supra note 227, at 422,
590 (discussing municipal gerrymandering in Alabama, North Carolina, and Virginia); KOUSSER,
supra note 253, at 31 (discussing gerrymandering at the state level); RABINOWITZ, supra note 261,
at 270 (“Gerrymandering in its various forms was the most effective tactic used by sympathetic
legislatures both to redeem the cities and to keep them in the hands of white Democrats.”);
LAWRENCE D. RICE, THE NEGRO IN TEXAS, 1874-1900, at 25 (1971) (discussing the
gerrymandering of Texas’s judicial districts).
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problem: widespread private discrimination that was transformed into
state power by an all-White and largely racist electorate. Rather than
representing an “impermissible racial stereotype[],”315 this political
reality motivated the Fifteenth Amendment’s passage. Unlike today,
racially polarized voting was not a constitutional taboo during
Reconstruction.
IV. RECONSTRUCTING RACIAL VOTE DILUTION
In defending Gingles and Section 2, scholars recognize that voting
rights are distinct from civil rights and that vote dilution claims are
premised on group-based conceptions of the right to vote. Professors
Pam Karlan and Daryl Levinson, for example, emphasize that “[r]acial
identification in the electoral context . . . is essentially ‘bottom-up,’
produced by the choices of members of the black community to unite
politically.”316 And Professor Heather Gerken argues that vote dilution
is best conceptualized as an “aggregate harm” rather than purely a
violation of a voter’s individual rights.317 Although these scholars
correctly point out that voting rights deserve a distinctive framework,
their claims are premised on political theory or an interpretation of the
VRA, rather than a historical and contextual understanding of the
Reconstruction Amendments. This Article fills this gap in the
literature.318

315. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
316. Karlan & Levinson, supra note 27, at 1218.
317. Gerken, Undiluted Vote, supra note 5, at 1681. According to Gerken, aggregate rights
differ from individual rights in three ways: (1) “fairness is measured in group terms”; (2) an
individual’s right “rises and falls with the . . . group”; and (3) “the right is unindividuated among
members of the group.” Id.
318. The closest academic account to my claim is an article published over two decades ago
by Professors Vikram Amar and Alan Brownstein, which examines the debates over the Fifteenth
Amendment and contends that the Shaw Court erred in its treatment of race-based redistricting.
See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 25, at 919. Amar and Brownstein’s argument differs from
mine in several important respects. First and foremost, Amar and Brownstein do not engage with
vote dilution doctrine; in fact, they do not even cite Gingles. See id. at 976–77 (spending two pages
discussing vote dilution doctrine and acknowledging that they give it “only brief consideration”).
Nor do they attempt to defend Gingles in particular or vote dilution doctrine more generally
under the Fifteenth Amendment. Furthermore, Amar and Brownstein advance a less doctrinal
and more theoretical claim about political rights, directing their attention to debates over
women’s suffrage and the jury-exclusion cases. See id. at 956–72 (women’s suffrage); id. at 981–
1005 (jury exclusion). And given the vast changes in election law that have transpired since 1998,
Amar and Brownstein do not engage with recent and significant decisions, including the Boerne
Court’s curtailment of Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority.
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Acknowledging the role of racially polarized voting during
Reconstruction has significant implications for modern vote dilution
doctrine. Indeed, this historical insight demonstrates that the Court’s
colorblind critiques319 misapprehend Congress’s Reconstruction
Amendment authority to remedy and deter dilutive schemes that
exploit racially polarized voting. And given several Justices’ professed
adherence to originalism, the Reconstruction Framers’ views and
candid discussions of racial bloc voting are particularly relevant. This
is especially salient because the same Justices who purport to be
originalist are the biggest supporters of Shaw and the most fervent
critics of Gingles. In many ways, these Justices’ application of
colorblind principles—originally developed under the Equal
Protection Clause—to Fifteenth Amendment cases appears to reflect
modern normative preferences more than fidelity to the original
understanding of the Reconstruction Amendments.
In this Part, I advance two ways to reconceptualize racial vote
dilution claims and the Gingles factors. The first argument builds off
the Court’s holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
intentional racial vote dilution and then rebuts the colorblind concerns
that have been articulated in the Shaw line of cases and smuggled into
Section 2 jurisprudence. Put simply, the Court’s unease with
recognizing racial bloc voting is totally detached from how the issue
was viewed during Reconstruction.
My second claim is that reimagining vote dilution claims as
violations of the Fifteenth Amendment is doctrinally defensible,
historically justified, normatively preferable, and strategically savvy.
This doctrinal reshuffling is not pointless formalism. As Professors
Guy-Uriel Charles and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer suggest, when “voting
rights lawyers and scholars begin to think of a response to Shelby
County, they will need to provide a compelling account of what
constitutes racial discrimination in voting in the 21st century,”
including whether it covers “only state action” or also encompasses
“[r]acially polarized voting by the electorate.”320 This Article answers
that call by taking the Fifteenth Amendment seriously as an
independent constitutional provision and thinking through how vote
dilution doctrine would work under that Amendment.
319. See supra Part II.
320. Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Voting Rights Act in Winter: The
Death of a Superstatute, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1389, 1423–24 (2015).
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Recall that the Reconstruction Framers differentiated between
political and civil rights.321 Based on that hierarchy of rights, the
Reconstruction Framers understood that the Fourteenth Amendment
primarily protected civil rights and did not mandate the
enfranchisement of any Black voters during Reconstruction.322 Hence,
the need for the Fifteenth Amendment.323 Modern doctrine, however,
papers over the Reconstruction-era understanding of rights.324
Reorienting voting rights doctrine toward the Fifteenth
Amendment would correct this problem and avoid transplanting the
colorblind concerns emanating from the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Fifteenth Amendment, where they are an ill fit. This intervention
is also important because state action under the Fifteenth Amendment
has been traditionally understood to cast a wider net than the
Fourteenth Amendment,325 thus creating more doctrinal breathing
room for considering contemporary levels of racial bloc voting and
combatting the dilutive schemes that exploit it. Finally, because it is an
open question whether Boerne’s congruence and proportionality test
applies outside the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 2 may be more
defensible under the Fifteenth Amendment.
To be clear, my argument in this Article is not that the
Reconstruction Framers specifically intended to prohibit vote dilution
under the Fifteenth Amendment or that the original expected
application of that Amendment was to prohibit vote dilution.326 Rather,
my claim is that that the original public meaning of the Fifteenth
Amendment does not foreclose an examination of racially polarized
voting as part of a vote dilution claim and that, at a minimum, vote
dilution claims are within Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment
enforcement authority.

321. See supra notes 221–27 and accompanying text.
322. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 25, at 928.
323. See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 25, at 1621.
324. See McConnell, Desegregation, supra note 223, at 1025 (“T[he Reconstruction Framers’]
categorization of rights plays no part in current interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The distinction between civil and political rights has been utterly obliterated.”).
325. See supra Part II.B.
326. See infra note 374 and accompanying text. In other words, I am not making an argument
based on original intent or original expected application. Cf. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113,
1114 (2003) (surveying the different schools of originalism).

CRUM IN PRINTER FINAL(DO NOT DELETE)

314

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

10/16/2020 12:51 PM

[Vol. 70:261

A. Reconstructing Shaw and Gingles
The Reconstruction Framers recognized that a South without
Black suffrage was a South with the Black Codes. In the early days of
Reconstruction, White southerners’ racist preferences were enacted
into law through a discriminatory electoral system,327 albeit one that
barred Black citizens from the polls rather than diluted their votes. In
seeking to transform the South, the Reconstruction Framers
enfranchised Black men in the First Reconstruction Act, assuming that
they would vote en masse to support the Republican Party and protect
their political interests.
By the time the Reconstruction Framers were debating and
passing the Fifteenth Amendment, they had witnessed landslide
multiracial elections across the South. The Reconstruction Framers’
predictions proved accurate and Black voters overwhelmingly
supported Republicans. The upshots were the ratification of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the first-ever Black elected
officials, Republican control of the southern constitutional
conventions, and the election of President Grant.
And most importantly for present purposes, the Reconstruction
Framers did not shy away from recognizing the existence of racial bloc
voting. Numerous Republicans—including Representative Boutwell,
who introduced the Fifteenth Amendment in the House—were explicit
about their belief that Black voters would mobilize as a bloc.328 The
Reconstruction Framers’ “arguments in favor of extending the
franchise” were thus “grounded on the perceived need for and
anticipated benefits of blacks voting as a coherent force.”329
If the Court were to view racially polarized voting through the lens
of Reconstruction, the doctrinal tension between Shaw and Gingles
would evaporate. Here, given that Shaw’s concerns bleed into the
criticisms of the Gingles factors, they can be treated as two sides of the
same coin.
Under the colorblind worldview, Section 2’s mandate for creating
majority-minority districts threatens to “unnecessarily infuse race into
virtually every redistricting [plan], raising serious constitutional

327. See supra Part III.A.
328. See supra Part III.B.
329. Amar & Brownstein, supra note 25, at 929 (emphasis added).
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questions.”330 The Court’s suspicion of the mere acknowledgement of
racial bloc voting under Gingles is misguided. For starters, Shaw
triggers strict scrutiny only if the use of race predominates during the
redistricting process.331 The critics of Gingles, however, do not limit
their complaints about race-based redistricting to those situations.332
This hair-trigger approach to race would have seemed totally alien
during Reconstruction. The Reconstruction Framers frankly discussed
the humanitarian—and partisan—importance of Black suffrage.333
Racial bloc voting was instrumental in the Fifteenth Amendment’s
passage and ratification. It would be beyond ironic if those same
concerns could no longer be acknowledged under that Amendment.334
Underlying the doctrine, the Court seems particularly troubled by
the presumption that “members of the same racial group . . . think
alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same
candidates at the polls.”335 But “[t]he voluntariness of racial and ethnic
330. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 21 (2009) (plurality opinion).
331. See supra notes 169–75 and accompanying text. Outside the political realm, the Court
has left the door open to situations where race is clearly considered in the decision-making process
but explicit racial classifications are not employed. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v.
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 545 (2015) (“When setting their larger goals, local
housing authorities may choose to foster diversity and combat racial isolation with race-neutral
tools, and mere awareness of race in attempting to solve the problems facing inner cities does not
doom that endeavor at the outset.”); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 789 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(“School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together students of diverse backgrounds and
races through other means, including strategic site selection of new schools” and “drawing
attendance zones with general recognition of the demographics of the neighborhoods . . . .”).
332. See supra notes 180–88 and accompanying text.
333. See supra Part III.B.
334. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 25, at 919 (“One cannot invalidate government race
consciousness in the political rights realm on grounds that it reflects unconstitutional assumptions
without dealing with the fact that the very constitutional provisions establishing political rights
for minorities were premised on those same assumptions.”).
335. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993). As a doctrinal matter, Gingles does no such
thing. Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing the Gingles factors and must prove that voting is,
in fact, racially polarized. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986). And indeed,
plaintiffs have demonstrated racial bloc voting in numerous lawsuits. See Katz et al., Documenting
Discrimination, supra note 33, at 756–70 tbl.B (collecting cases). But even this burden of proof is
insufficient for Gingles’s critics, who claim that, “as practically applied,” the preconditions are
“little different from a working assumption that racial groups can be conceived largely as political
interest groups.” Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 905 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment). Of course, defendants sometimes concede certain Gingles factors in Section 2
litigation. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 16 (plurality opinion). But in Shaw cases, line drawers must
have a “strong basis in evidence” for treating voting as racially polarized. Cooper v. Harris, 137
S. Ct. 1455, 1464 (2017); see also supra notes 173–75 and accompanying text. This requirement

CRUM IN PRINTER FINAL(DO NOT DELETE)

316

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

10/16/2020 12:51 PM

[Vol. 70:261

group affiliation in the political process requires that [racial] groups be
recognized as expressing legitimate interests; not to do so would be to
denigrate the autonomy of those individuals who choose to affiliate
themselves along this axis.”336 The Reconstruction Framers recognized
this fact.337 The current Court does not. Rather than follow the
Reconstruction generation’s view of racial bloc voting, the Court is
putting forth its own normative vision of how politics should be
organized, how electoral coalitions should be formed, and how citizens
should vote.
The Court’s teleological account of racial politics is also divorced
from the Constitution.338 According to the Court, race-based
redistricting “threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political
system in which race no longer matters—a goal that the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments embody.”339 Contrary to the Court’s rosecolored view, the Reconstruction Framers assumed that racial bloc
voting would persist into the future. Indeed, the Reconstruction
Framers pushed through the Fifteenth Amendment because they did
not trust White southerners to protect the rights of the freedmen—a
concern that was heightened after the Southern States were readmitted
to the Union and Congress lacked authority to regulate their suffrage
qualifications.340 And once again, the Reconstruction Framers’
prediction proved tragically correct. The end to Reconstruction
revealed the dark side of racial bloc voting, as the Redeemers
gerrymandered Black voters out of political power.341
Moreover, the Court’s self-aggrandized role in leading our nation
to a post-racial future is difficult to square with the historical context
of Reconstruction. The Reconstruction Amendments were designed to

bolsters Section 2’s constitutionality by preventing jurisdictions from merely assuming racial bloc
voting.
336. Karlan & Levinson, supra note 27, at 1217 (emphasis omitted).
337. See supra Part III.B.
338. See Gerken, Third Way, supra note 157, at 744–45 (observing that the Court’s cases
reflect “a search for the right strategy to bring us closer to the world of normal politics”).
339. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657.
340. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
33 (1980) (discussing the Reconstruction Framers’ distrust of southern legislatures); KLARMAN,
supra note 227, at 29 (explaining that, after the Southern States were readmitted to the Union,
“Congress did not clearly possess alternative, constitutionally permissible means of mandating
black suffrage by statute”).
341. See supra notes 311–14 and accompanying text.
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empower Congress—not the Court—to enforce their provisions.342
And in 1982, Congress, following much deliberation and after
considering evidence of racially polarized voting,343 revised Section 2
of the VRA to prohibit vote dilution and to encompass a
discriminatory effects standard.344 Congress has determined that
racially polarized voting and vote dilution remain serious problems.
The Court’s overt skepticism of that choice is inappropriate under the
Reconstruction Amendments.
Given the Court’s institutional role, its diagnosis of racial politics
is—unsurprisingly—dubious. In seeking to test Shaw’s underlying
premises, a recent study by Professors Stephen Ansolabehere and Nate
Persily concluded that “residents of [majority-minority districts] are
indistinguishable from residents of other districts in their answers to
questions attempting to measure belief in racial stereotypes.”345 The
study further concluded that “[t]o the extent [that there are]
statistically significant differences across districts, those differences are
not among racial minorities, but among Whites, and can be explained
by the relative conservatism of Southern Whites.”346 In other words,
race-based redistricting has not “balkanize[d] us into competing racial
factions.”347 Or consider the Shelby County Court’s claim that “[t]hings
have changed in the South,”348 which was quickly rebutted by a wave
of voter-suppression laws enacted after the VRA’s coverage formula
was invalidated.349

342. See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 223, at 361–63 (describing the
Reconstruction Framers’ decision to adopt McCulloch’s deferential standard for Congress’s
Reconstruction Amendment enforcement authority); Balkin, Reconstruction, supra note 193, at
1805 (“Congress gave itself these powers because it believed it could not trust the Supreme Court
to protect the rights of the freedmen.”); McConnell, Institutions, supra note 210, at 182 (“Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment was born of the fear that the judiciary would frustrate
Reconstruction by a narrow interpretation of congressional power.”).
343. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982) (listing the Senate Factors).
344. See supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text.
345. Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Testing Shaw v. Reno: Do Majority-Minority
Districts Cause Expressive Harms?, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1041, 1043 (2015).
346. Id. By contrast, the VRA’s “coverage formula actually did a remarkably good job of
picking out states whose non-black residents harbor exceptionally negative stereotypes of African
Americans.” Elmendorf & Spencer, Racial Stereotyping, supra note 52, at 1127.
347. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993).
348. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 540 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Nw.
Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202 (2009)).
349. See, e.g., Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989, 999 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc)
(invalidating Arizona’s restrictions on out-of-precinct ballots and third-party ballot collectors),
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To be clear, “a political system in which race no longer matters”350
is a laudable goal. It is also a quintessentially modern goal, one at odds
with how the Reconstruction Framers viewed the issue. Thus, if the
Court thinks that it is the best-positioned institution in our democracy
to decouple race and politics, then it needs a different, non-originalist
theory for questioning the VRA’s protections and for second-guessing
Congress’s solution to the problem of racial discrimination in voting.
Or to put it more bluntly, to the extent Gingles’s critics think that vote
dilution doctrine raises “questions of political philosophy, not
questions of law,”351 they are guilty of the same sin—imposing their
own political preferences instead of following their purported
adherence to originalism.352
Focusing now on Gingles and the VRA, recall that Congress relied
on its Reconstruction Amendment enforcement authority to adopt
Section 2’s discriminatory effects standard.353 Thus, the “distinction
between the constitutional [vote dilution] claim, which requires proof
of intent, and the statutory claim, which demands only proof of
discriminatory results, will be quite important when the
constitutionality of § 2 is challenged.”354 The greater the overlap

cert. granted sub nom. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., No. 19-1257, 2020 WL 5847130 (U.S.
Oct. 2, 2020); N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 242 (4th Cir. 2016)
(striking down North Carolina’s post-Shelby County voter-suppression law); Patino v. City of
Pasadena, 230 F. Supp. 3d 667, 673–74 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (finding that city’s post-Shelby County
redistricting plan intentionally diluted the votes of Hispanic voters).
350. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657.
351. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 901 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
352. Justice Thomas is the Court’s most prominent and uncompromising originalist. He
recently questioned the Court’s one-person, one-vote precedent on the grounds that “[t]he
Constitution does not prescribe any one basis for apportionment within States.” Evenwel v.
Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1133 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Despite his
willingness to reconsider some aspects of the Fourteenth Amendment’s application to voting
rights, Thomas continues to follow Shaw, a doctrine based solely on the Equal Protection Clause.
See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1485–86 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) (defending Shaw);
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 649 (holding that the Shaw cause of action is premised on the Equal Protection
Clause). And in arguing that Section 5 and the VRA’s coverage formula were unconstitutional,
Thomas invoked Boerne notwithstanding its dubious originalist pedigree. See Nw. Austin, 557
U.S. at 225–26 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (relying on
Boerne); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 564 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (renouncing Boerne);
McConnell, Institutions, supra note 210, at 194 (criticizing Boerne on originalist grounds). The
selectivity of Thomas’s application of originalism to election law cases appears—pardon the
pun—gerrymandered.
353. See supra Part I.C.
354. Gerken, Undiluted Vote, supra note 5, at 1674.

CRUM IN PRINTER FINAL(DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

RACIALLY POLARIZED VOTING

10/16/2020 12:51 PM

319

between the constitutional and statutory standard, the more likely it is
that Section 2 will survive that inevitable constitutional challenge.
Although Gingles puts greater emphasis on racial bloc voting in
the statutory vote dilution analysis,355 it has always been part of the
constitutional inquiry.356 The Gingles factors, therefore, are a
refinement of the constitutional standard, not an abandonment of it.
Both the constitutional and statutory tests look to whether minority
voters have an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice.
The Gingles factors brought much-needed order and predictability to
vote dilution litigation by prioritizing compactness and racial bloc
voting in the inquiry.357
Finally, under my view, supporters of Section 2 could point to high
levels of racially polarized voting—nationwide and especially in the
South358—to defend against the inevitable constitutional challenge.359
Put simply, jurisdictions with “racial polarization in voting have a
greater need for prophylactic measures to prevent purposeful race
discrimination.”360 And here, it is important to distinguish between the
Court’s misconception of the Reconstruction Amendments and the
function of the Gingles preconditions. Notwithstanding that the
Reconstruction Framers assumed racial polarization would continue
into the future, the Gingles factors do, in fact, place a de facto sunset

355. Issacharoff, Polarized Voting, supra note 21, at 1851.
356. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616 (1982) (“The minority’s voting power in a
multimember district is particularly diluted when bloc voting occurs and ballots are cast along
strict majority-minority lines.”); supra Part I.C (discussing White’s totality-of-the-circumstances
standard).
357. See supra note 144–146 and accompanying text.
358. See supra Part I.B.
359. The Shelby County Court refused to credit evidence of higher rates of racially polarized
voting in the South. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 578 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (discussing congressional findings about racial bloc voting). Under my theory,
Congress could also point to disparate levels of racially polarized voting in crafting a new coverage
formula. See Elmendorf & Spencer, Racial Stereotyping, supra note 52, at 1128 (arguing in favor
of a new coverage formula that “treat[s] racial discrimination by voters as the linchpin for
coverage”). However, given Shelby County’s equal sovereignty principle and its hostility to
proxies for unconstitutional conduct, see Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 550–51, a coverage formula
based solely on racially polarized voting may raise constitutional concerns. See Travis Crum, The
Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2019, TAKE CARE BLOG (Mar. 1, 2019),
https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-voting-rights-advancement-act-of-2019 [https://perma.cc/9ENA-FH7L]
(explaining that coverage formulas based on proxies are more open to constitutional challenge).
360. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 578 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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date on Section 2.361 If our nation ever does achieve a post-racial
politics, then Section 2 will no longer have a role to play in vote dilution
litigation.
Instead of refusing to even acknowledge the realities of racially
polarized voting, the Court should recognize that Section 2 plays an
invaluable role in ensuring that minority voters’ political power is not
diminished by the use of redistricting plans and dilutive schemes that
predictably exploit racial bloc voting.
B. Reconstructing the Fifteenth Amendment
The Court has repeatedly declined to decide whether the Fifteenth
Amendment encompasses vote dilution claims.362 But if such claims are
cognizable under the Fifteenth Amendment’s substantive scope or
within Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment enforcement authority, then
there are good reasons not to transplant the Fourteenth Amendment’s
colorblind principles to vote dilution doctrine. This reorientation of
voting rights doctrine to the Fifteenth Amendment responds to each of
the concerns articulated above concerning Gingles in particular and
vote dilution doctrine more generally.363
1. Race-Based Redistricting. At the risk of repetition, the Court
has voiced concern that Section 2 will entrench racial divisions and
compel the overt consideration of race in redistricting.364 These
concerns mirror the Court’s hostility to race-conscious laws and
represent yet another instantiation of “[t]he idea that equal protection
might affirmatively prohibit the use of statutory disparate impact
standards.”365 This criticism of Section 2 stems from the Court’s
conflation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as well as its

361. See Gerken, Third Way, supra note 157, at 745; Karlan, Two Section Twos, supra note
106, at 741.
362. See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 159 (1993).
363. See supra Part II. There are two ways litigants could establish that the Fifteenth
Amendment encompasses vote dilution claims. They could wait and defend Section 2 against a
future constitutional challenge under a Fifteenth Amendment theory. Alternatively, they could
go on the offense and bring constitutional claims as part of an attempt to “bail-in” a jurisdiction
under the VRA. See Crum, Pocket Trigger, supra note 133, at 2035 (arguing that Section 3(c)
could be used to “relitigate the outer limits of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments”). This
latter strategy has the potential upshot of creating precedent that could later be invoked to defend
Section 2.
364. See supra Part II.A.
365. Primus, supra note 190, at 495.
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refusal to acknowledge the differences between political and civil
rights.366 In other words, the Court has improperly transplanted
colorblind principles from its equal protection jurisprudence to the
voting rights realm. But the well-worn debate between proponents of
the anticlassification and antisubordination principles is an odd fit for
the Fifteenth Amendment.367
For the Reconstruction Framers, the relevant touchstone was
equal access to suffrage and the empowerment of Black voters,368 not
the colorblind notion that race and politics should not intersect. The
Reconstruction Framers were well aware that Black and White voters
in the former Confederacy had dramatically divergent interests and
that these differences would be reflected in their preferred political
parties. As such, the Reconstruction Framers recognized that political
rights were exercised by groups, not just individuals.
And rather than treat racial bloc voting as a taboo, the
Reconstruction Framers repeatedly referenced it as a reason to pass
the Fifteenth Amendment. To be sure, that reason mingled altruistic
concerns with partisan self-interest. But everyone—including
opponents—recognized what was at stake in passing the Fifteenth
Amendment: the empowerment of a new Black voter base in the
Border States and additional federal protections for already
enfranchised Black voters in the South.369
Moreover, the political power wielded by Black voters during
Reconstruction was substantial. After the passage of the First
Reconstruction Act, Black voters were effective majorities in five
states.370 Racial bloc voting thus allowed Black voters to push through
366. See, e.g., Issacharoff, Polarized Voting, supra note 21, at 1845; Crum, Superfluous, supra
note 25, at 1564–65.
367. Cf. Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of
Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1280–81 (2011) (outlining this debate). To
simplify somewhat, the colorblind, or anticlassification, school of thought believes that explicit
racial classifications are unconstitutional “except as a remedy for specific wrongdoing,” id., and
has begun to question the constitutionality of “race-conscious, facially neutral initiatives,” id. at
1282. By contrast, the antisubordination school of thought “would allow (or require) government
to remedy practices that entrench historic inequalities among racial groups.” Id. Professor Reva
Siegel goes beyond this classic dichotomy and identifies a third school of thought—the
antibalkanization school—which “understands that race-conscious, facially neutral interventions
may promote social cohesion by promoting equal opportunity.” Id. at 1283.
368. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 983 (1869) (statement of Sen. Ross) (“The
ballot is as much the bulwark of liberty to the black man as it is to the white.”).
369. See supra Part III.
370. See FONER, supra note 227, at 294 n.27; VALELLY, supra note 257, at 32–33 tbl.2.1.
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the new southern constitutions and ensured that Republicans
controlled all of those conventions. Although relegated to minority
status in the country as a whole, Black voters could control
governments in the South, where they were demographically
concentrated at the time.371 Given our nation’s federal structure, Black
suffrage “create[d] a distinct type of political space . . . where
[nationwide] electoral minorities [could] enjoy the dignity to decide”
their own fate.372 By mobilizing as a group, Black voters were able to
protect their own interests.373
This theoretical account raises the question: Does the Fifteenth
Amendment protect against vote dilution? Turning to the Fifteenth
Amendment’s text, two key phrases signal the Amendment’s broad
potential application.374 First, the Fifteenth Amendment protects the
“right . . . to vote.”375 That term, however, is not self-defining.376 On a
narrow view, the right to vote means the basic mechanics of registering,
casting a ballot, and having it counted.377 But on a broader view, the
right to vote could mean the right to cast a meaningful ballot. In other
words, the right to vote encompasses the right to not have one’s vote
371. See supra notes 256–61 and accompanying text (discussing demographics of
Reconstruction). That said, Black voters were rarely represented in proportion to their
percentage in the population, see supra notes 265–66, and “their very unanimity as Republicans
meant their ballots could be taken for granted by party leaders seeking the white vote,” FONER,
supra note 227, at 331.
372. Gerken, Second-Order, supra note 116, at 1104; see also Heather K. Gerken, Foreword:
Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 48–59 (2010) (arguing that federalism allows
racial minorities to control certain institutions).
373. As is well-known, Reconstruction ended in tragedy. In addition to the exploitation of
racial bloc voting by Redemption-era gerrymanders, Black voting power was nullified by an
unrelenting campaign of terror, fraud, and outright disenfranchisement. See FONER, supra note
227, at 590; see also supra notes 311–14 and accompanying text. Moreover, as recent partisan
gerrymandering cases have demonstrated, it is possible to dilute the votes of a majority party. See
Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1925 (2018) (observing that Wisconsin “Democrats [would]
need[] 54% of the statewide vote to secure a majority in the legislature”).
374. In keeping with this Article’s attempt to engage Gingles’s critics, I advance mainly
originalist and textualist arguments. In the discussion that follows, I am not purporting to fully
address the metes and bounds of the Fifteenth Amendment. See infra notes 375–96 and
accompanying text. That is a task for a future article.
375. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
376. Cf. Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights To Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX.
L. REV. 1705, 1719 (1993) (conceptualizing the right to vote as a participatory right, an aggregative
right, and a right of governance).
377. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980) (plurality opinion) (construing the
Fifteenth Amendment as limited to whether racial minorities can “register and vote without
hindrance”).
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diluted—an opportunity to elect one’s candidate of choice.378 The
Fifteenth Amendment, moreover, does not specify that the “right to
vote” is tied to any particular election, and the Court has construed
that phrase to apply broadly.379
Second, the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits the “deni[al] or
abridg[ment]” of the right to vote.380 The fact that the Reconstruction
Framers selected two verbs is telling. An interpretation of the Fifteenth
Amendment limited to mere vote denial claims would “render[] some
words altogether redundant.”381 Indeed, as Justice Marshall explained
in his Bolden dissent, “[b]y providing that the right to vote cannot be
discriminatorily ‘denied or abridged,’” the Fifteenth Amendment
“assuredly strikes down the diminution as well as the outright denial of
the exercise of the franchise.”382
But this is more than just disjunctive phrasing. The Reconstruction
Framers’ use of the word “abridged” militates in favor of broadly
protecting the right to vote. At the time, dictionaries defined “abridge”
as “to contract,” “to diminish,” or “[t]o deprive of.”383 Today, the word
“abridge” similarly means “to reduce in scope” or to “diminish.”384
And since the term “denied” adequately captures the scenario where a
voter is prevented from casting their ballot, the term “abridge”
presumably carries this broader meaning.

378. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2018); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973).
379. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 523 (2000) (“The [Fifteenth] Amendment applies to
‘any election in which public issues are decided or public officials selected.’” (quoting Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 468 (1953) (plurality opinion))); see also Davis v. Guam, 932 F.3d 822, 830
(9th Cir. 2019) (“The text of the Fifteenth Amendment states broadly that the right ‘to vote’ shall
not be denied. It does not qualify the meaning of ‘vote’ in any way.” (citation omitted)).
380. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
381. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (“It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended
to be without effect.”); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 174–79 (2012) (discussing the surplusage canon).
382. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 126 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
383. JOHNSON’S ENGLISH DICTIONARY 58 (J.R. Worcester ed., Phila., Jas. B. Smith & Co.
1859); see also JOSEPH E. WORCESTER, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 6 (Bos.,
Swan, Brewer & Tileston 1860) (“To curtail; to reduce; to contract; to diminish.”); WILLIAM G.
WEBSTER & WILLIAM A. WHEELER, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2 (N.Y. &
Chi., Ivison, Blakeman, Taylor & Co. 1878) (“To deprive; to cut off.”). Here, I avoid citing the
definitions that clearly reference the abridged version of a published work and focus instead on
the more generic definitions.
384. Abridge, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
abridge [https://perma.cc/3XK4-YHKR].
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Moreover, “[w]hen seeking to discern the meaning of a word in
the Constitution, there is no better dictionary than the rest of the
Constitution itself.”385 Prior to the Fifteenth Amendment’s passage, the
word “abridge”—or its variations—appeared three times in the
Constitution.386
Most famously, the First Amendment provides that “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”387 Of course,
there is substantial case law interpreting the First Amendment to
broadly protect free speech.388 Just as the First Amendment has been
expansively construed to protect free expression, so too should the
Fifteenth Amendment be read to protect the right to vote free of racial
discrimination.
In addition, the Fourteenth Amendment uses the word “abridge”
not once, but twice. Section One provides that “[n]o State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States.”389 Unlike the First Amendment, there is
scant doctrine on the meaning of the word “abridge” in the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Privileges or Immunities Clause is essentially a

385. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2681 (2015)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747,
748 (1999) (defining intratextualism as “read[ing] a contested word or phrase that appears in the
Constitution in light of another passage in the Constitution featuring the same (or a very similar)
word or phrase”).
386. Since the Fifteenth Amendment, the word “abridged” has been used in every subsequent
voting rights amendment that has prohibited discriminatory voter qualifications. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIX (concerning women’s suffrage); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (concerning poll tax);
U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (concerning age).
As this Article was in the penultimate stage of publication, a divided panel of the Fifth
Circuit held that “an election law abridges a person’s right to vote for the purposes of the TwentySixth Amendment only if it makes voting more difficult for that person than it was before the law
was enacted or enforced.” Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, No. 20-50407, 2020 WL 5422917, at
*15 (5th Cir. Sept. 10, 2020). For critiques of this badly reasoned decision, see Travis Crum,
Abridging the Right to Vote in the Fifth Circuit, TAKE CARE BLOG (Sept. 15, 2020),
https://takecareblog.com/blog/abridging-the-right-to-vote-in-the-fifth-circuit [https://perma.cc/LY552YP5], and Joshua A. Douglas, Opinion, A Texas Federal Court Decision is the Latest Hit to Voting
Rights in America, CNN (Sept. 12, 2020, 7:56 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/12/opinions/
voting-rights-texas-26th-amendment-election-douglas/index.html [https://perma.cc/T5YST73M].
387. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
388. See, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[T]he First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content.”).
389. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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doctrinal dead letter, though not because of the word “abridge.”390
Section Two authorizes a reduction of a state’s seats in the House of
Representatives if “the right to vote” of any adult male citizens is
“denied . . . or in any way abridged.”391 Section Two’s apportionment
penalty has never been enforced by Congress,392 but the connection
between the “deni[al] . . . or . . . abridg[ment]”393 of the right to vote
and a reduction in House seats underscores the Reconstruction
Framers’ understanding that political rights were exercised
collectively. Given the temporal closeness between the Fourteenth and

390. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 758–59 (2010) (plurality opinion)
(declining to revive the Privileges or Immunities Clause); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36,
78–79 (1872) (narrowly construing the Privileges or Immunities Clause as protecting rights
associated with federal citizenship).
391. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. Scholars have recently turned their attention to Section
Two and debated its ongoing relevance. See AMAR, UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 24,
at 188 (arguing that Section Two “provides the missing foundations for the general ‘right to vote’
championed by the Warren [Court] majority”); Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon
Disenfranchisement, and the Right To Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259, 260 (2004) (arguing that Section Two was “repealed
upon ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment”); Michael Hurta, Note, Counting the Right To
Vote in the Next Census: Reviving Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, 94 TEX. L. REV.
147, 170–73 (2015) (arguing that the Census Bureau or a court should enforce Section Two);
Magliocca, supra note 242, at 776 (arguing that the current statutory scheme for apportioning
representatives violates Section Two); Earl M. Maltz, The Forgotten Provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment: Section 2 and the Evolution of American Democracy, 76 LA. L. REV. 149, 178 (2015)
(“[C]haracterizing Section 2 as fully embracing the modern ideal of one person, one vote would
be a mistake.”); Michael T. Morley, Remedial Equilibration and the Right to Vote Under Section
2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 279, 310 (2015) (“A requirement that
applied to persons of all races did not ‘abridge’ anyone’s right to vote on account of race.”);
Tolson, Abridgment, supra note 225, at 458 (“Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was the
Reconstruction Congress’s attempt to constitutionalize a mechanism that would allow Congress
to all but legislate universal suffrage . . . .”).
In July 2020, the Trump Administration sought to exclude undocumented immigrants from
the congressional apportionment process on the grounds that those undocumented immigrants
are not “inhabitants” for purposes of Section Two. See Hansi Lo Wang, With No Final Say, Trump
Wants To Change Who Counts For Dividing Up Congress’ Seats, NPR (July 21, 2020, 6:34 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/07/21/892340508/with-no-final-say-trump-wants-to-change-whocounts-for-dividing-up-congress-seat [https://perma.cc/85GK-3XLN] (discussing a Trump
Administration memorandum calling for “the exclusion of unauthorized immigrants from the
numbers used to divide up seats in Congress among the states”); see also New York v. Trump, 20CV-5770, 2020 WL 5422959, at *32 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2020) (holding that the Trump
Administration memorandum violates two statutory provisions governing reapportionment).
Alabama has also filed a lawsuit seeking to exclude undocumented immigrants from the
reapportionment process. See Alabama v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 396 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1046 (N.D.
Ala. 2019). At the time of writing, these disputes have not been fully resolved.
392. See Magliocca, supra note 242, at 783.
393. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.

CRUM IN PRINTER FINAL(DO NOT DELETE)

326

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

10/16/2020 12:51 PM

[Vol. 70:261

Fifteenth Amendments and that “abridged” in Section Two is tied to
voting rights, a similar inference should be applied to the Fifteenth
Amendment.394
Here, I do not purport to exhaustively address whether the
Fifteenth Amendment prohibits vote dilution.395 Rather, my claim is
that the Fifteenth Amendment permits mapmakers, courts, and
Congress to consider racially polarized voting and that, even if the
Fifteenth Amendment does not itself proscribe vote dilution, Congress
may take that additional step under its enforcement authority.396
2. Private Action. Reframing vote dilution as a Fifteenth
Amendment injury provides a powerful response to the criticism that
racial bloc voting is private action. Although the Fifteenth
Amendment’s text refers to the states and the federal government, the
Court has interpreted the Amendment to prohibit certain private
actions that interfere with the right to vote free of racial discrimination.
Shortly after the Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification, Congress passed
laws prohibiting private electoral violence,397 and the Supreme Court
upheld those laws.398 It was not until 1903 that the Court imposed a

394. See Franita Tolson, The Constitutional Structure of Voting Rights Enforcement, 89 WASH.
L. REV. 379, 414 (2014) (“[T]he textual and historical link between section 1 of the Fifteenth
Amendment and section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . mandate that they be interpreted
in light of each other in determining the scope of congressional authority.”).
395. See supra note 374.
396. See infra Part IV.B.3.
397. An Act To Enforce the Right of Citizens of the United States To Vote in the Several
States of this Union, ch. 114, § 5, 16 Stat. 140, 141 (1870); cf. McConnell, Desegregation, supra
note 223, at 984 (“The actions taken by Congress from 1868 through 1875 to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment and the congressional deliberations over those measures thus present
the best available evidence of the original understanding of the meaning of the
Amendment . . . .”). The statute that was proposed simultaneously with the Fifteenth
Amendment also covered private action. See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 25, at 1605 n.379
(discussing H.R. 1667, 40th Cong. (1869)).
398. See Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 665–66 (1884) (holding that Congress could
prohibit private interference with the right to vote free of racial discrimination under the Fifteenth
Amendment). In United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875), the Court invalidated two provisions
of the Enforcement Act of 1870. Section 3 imposed criminal penalties on election officials who
“wrongfully refuse[d] or omit[ted] to receive [or] count . . . the vote of such citizen.” Id. at 217.
Section 4 imposed criminal penalties on “any person who shall, by force, bribery, threats,
intimidation, or other unlawful means, hinder [or] delay . . . any citizen from doing any act
required to be done to qualify him to vote, or from voting, in any election.” Id. (emphasis added).
Section 3 thus targeted state actors whereas Section 4 proscribed public and private conduct. The
Court invalidated both provisions because Congress had not specified that the denial of the right
to vote needed to be based on race, color, or previous condition of servitude—not because Section
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state action requirement on the Fifteenth Amendment.399 Nonetheless,
the Court subsequently adopted an expansive interpretation of state
action under the Fifteenth Amendment, including primaries held by
private clubs.400 Read together, these cases “provide[] precedent for
congressional proscription of private conduct under the [F]ifteenth
[A]mendment.”401
The Court, therefore, conceives of state action more broadly
under the Fifteenth Amendment than under the Fourteenth.402 This
creates much-needed doctrinal space for considering high levels of
racially polarized voting as part of the Gingles inquiry and for
defending Section 2 more generally. And the fact that the
Reconstruction Framers repeatedly referenced racial bloc voting in
passing the Fifteenth Amendment means that it should remain proper
to take that phenomenon into account today.
To be sure, even if racial bloc voting is deemed private action, that
is a separate question from whether Congress and the judiciary can
consider its existence when determining the legality of a particular
electoral scheme. A redistricting plan itself is state action; it is, after all,
a law passed by a state or locality.403 Rehnquist and Thomas therefore
err in focusing on racial bloc voting because the relevant action for vote
dilution purposes is the dilutive scheme itself.

4 criminalized private action. See id. at 218 (“It is only when the wrongful refusal at such an
election is because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, that Congress can interfere,
and provide for its punishment.”); see also Katz, Reinforcing Representation, supra note 208, at
2360 (“Reese . . . establish[es] definitively that Congress can broadly reach private action when
acting to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment’s proscription on race-based discrimination in
voting.”).
399. See James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 138–39 (1903); Tolson, Spectrum, supra note 194, at
337 (discussing James’s unprecedented holding).
400. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469–70 (1953) (plurality opinion) (concluding that the
Jaybird Association’s exclusion of Black people from its Democratic Party straw poll qualified as
state action and thus violated the Fifteenth Amendment).
401. Note, The Strange Career of “State Action” under the Fifteenth Amendment, 74 YALE L.J.
1448, 1459 (1965). Similar questions about state action arose under the VRA, and the Court took
an expansive view of state action there as well. See Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S.
186, 219 (1996) (plurality opinion) (determining that a change to political party’s nominating
process had to be precleared under Section 5 of the VRA).
402. The Fourteenth Amendment does not cover private action. See supra Part II.B.
403. See Karlan & Levinson, supra note 27, at 1203 (“Although states cannot prohibit racially
polarized voting directly, race-conscious districting offers an effective technique for combating its
effects.”). This point applies to both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
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3. Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment Enforcement Authority.
Finally, reconceptualizing vote dilution claims under the Fifteenth
Amendment will help rebut arguments that Congress exceeded its
enforcement authority when it revised Section 2 in 1982. Even if vote
dilution claims fall outside the Fifteenth Amendment’s substantive
scope, that is not the end of the matter.404 After all, Congress may pass
“appropriate” legislation to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.405 As
the above discussion demonstrates, the Fifteenth Amendment contains
ambiguous language.406 Although “Congress may enact so-called
prophylactic legislation”407 under Boerne’s court-centric view of
constitutional interpretation,408 it would have greater leeway to
independently interpret the scope of the “right . . . to vote” and the
meaning of “abridge” under Katzenbach’s rationality standard.409
Thus, Section 2 is on far firmer constitutional ground if Katzenbach
supplies the governing constitutional standard.
Although the Reconstruction Amendments contain “virtually
identical” enforcement clauses,410 there are good reasons for
differentiating between them in light of current doctrine. The Fifteenth
Amendment’s targeted protections against racial discrimination in
voting raise far fewer separation-of-powers concerns than the
Fourteenth Amendment’s capacious language.411 The Court,
moreover, has never decided whether Boerne’s congruence and
proportionality test applies to the Fifteenth Amendment. None of the
Boerne line of cases “involve[] race, voting, the Fifteenth Amendment,

404. Strictly speaking, it is unnecessary for the Court to clearly define the substantive scope
of the underlying constitutional right under Katzenbach’s rationality standard. See Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 645, 648 (1966). The same is not true under Boerne. See Bd. of Trs. of the
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001).
405. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
406. See supra Part IV.B.1.
407. Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727–28 (2003).
408. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 527 (1997) (“Any suggestion that Congress
has a substantive, non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported by our
case law.”).
409. See McConnell, Institutions, supra note 210, at 184 (noting that, under Katzenbach, the
question is “whether the congressional interpretation is within a reasonable range of plausible
interpretations—not whether it is the same as the Supreme Court’s”).
410. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373 n.8 (2001).
411. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Lawfulness of Section 5—And Thus of Section 5, 126 HARV.
L. REV. F. 109, 119–20 (2013); Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on
Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1190–91 (2001); Crum, Superfluous, supra note 25, at
1626.
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or Congress’s authority to remedy racial discrimination in voting.”412
Furthermore, the Shelby County Court did not hold that Boerne
applies to the Fifteenth Amendment.413
Rather, “Shelby County’s equal sovereignty principle is an
example of freestanding federalism and is thus limited to laws that
differentiate between the states.”414 In Allen v. Cooper,415 the Court
confronted its first post-Shelby County case concerning Congress’s
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority.416 In striking down a
nationwide statute,417 the Allen Court applied Boerne’s congruence and
proportionality test and failed to even cite Shelby County.418 The
omission of Shelby County’s equal sovereignty language was perhaps
unsurprising given that the challenged statute did not differentiate
between the states. However, Allen also omitted any reference to
Shelby County’s requirement that “a statute’s ‘current burdens’ must

412. Crum, Superfluous, supra note 25, at 1575. Some Justices may be open to applying
Katzenbach’s rationality standard to statutes enacted under Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement authority to remedy racial discrimination. Indeed, Justice Scalia adhered to this
position. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 564 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (renouncing
Boerne and stating that “principally for reasons of stare decisis, I shall henceforth apply the
permissive McCulloch standard to congressional measures designed to remedy racial
discrimination by the States”).
413. See Elmendorf & Spencer, Racial Stereotyping, supra note 52, at 1129 (“Shelby County
dodged an important question about the standard of review . . . .”); Richard L. Hasen, Shelby
County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 713, 727 (2014) (criticizing
“the Court’s decision to sidestep the standard of review” question in Shelby County); Tolson,
Spectrum, supra note 194, at 337 (“It is unclear if City of Boerne also applies to the Fifteenth
Amendment . . . .”).
414. Crum, Superfluous, supra note 25, at 1575–76 (quotation marks and footnote omitted).
Coined by Professor John Manning, the concept of freestanding federalism describes cases where
the Court employs a structural argument to invalidate a federal statute “without purporting to
ground its decision[] in any particular provision of the constitutional text.” John F. Manning,
Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003,
2005 (2009). Other scholars have argued that Shelby County is an example of freestanding
federalism. See Colby, supra note 233, at 1168; Leah M. Litman, Inventing Equal Sovereignty, 114
MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1259 (2016); cf. Tolson, Reinventing, supra note 186, at 1259 (predicting after
Northwest Austin that its “free-floating federalism norm c[ould] raise the evidentiary threshold
so high that Congress could never amass enough evidence of voting discrimination to justify the
renewal of section 5 or develop a coverage formula”).
415. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020).
416. See Travis Crum, The Curious Disappearance of Shelby County, ELECTION L. BLOG
(Mar. 27, 2020, 7:03 AM), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=110263 [https://perma.cc/4DXZ-2NLF].
417. See Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1007 (finding that Congress’s abrogation of state sovereign
immunity in the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990 was unconstitutional).
418. See id. at 1004–05.
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be justified by ‘current needs,’”419 demonstrating that this prong of the
test is contingent on a differentiation between the states.420 Allen thus
established that Shelby County is limited to coverage formulas. Given
that Section 2 is a “nationwide ban on racial discrimination,”421 Shelby
County’s equal sovereignty principle is simply not implicated.
Accordingly, defending Section 2 under the Fifteenth
Amendment and Katzenbach’s rationality standard is not only
doctrinally open but also strategically savvy because Congress would
be given far greater interpretive and remedial authority to protect the
right to vote. And that is true regardless of whether the Fifteenth
Amendment itself prohibits vote dilution.
To sum up, there are several doctrinal payoffs for
reconceptualizing vote dilution claims under the Fifteenth
Amendment. First, grounding racial vote dilution claims in the
Fifteenth Amendment is more historically appropriate given the
Reconstruction Framers’ views on the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments’ protections for distinct bundles of rights. And because
the Court’s colorblind vision of the Equal Protection Clause ignores
the key differences between voting rights and other rights, defending
racial vote dilution claims under the Fifteenth Amendment will
encourage jurists to rethink how they have applied Fourteenth
Amendment principles to Fifteenth Amendment cases. Second, the
Fifteenth Amendment casts a wider net than the Fourteenth
Amendment for what qualifies as state action. As such, the Court can
properly look at the interaction between racial bloc voting and dilutive
schemes in adjudicating redistricting suits and determining whether
Section 2 is constitutional. And finally, because Congress has greater
leeway under current doctrine to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment
than the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 2 is on firmer ground against
the inevitable constitutional challenge.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s aversion to acknowledging the reality of
racially polarized voting and its hostility to race-based redistricting
have shaped voting rights doctrine for over twenty-five years. The
419. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 550 (2013) (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist.
No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204 (2009)).
420. See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 25, at 1576 (arguing that Shelby County “melded these
two principles into one standard”).
421. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 557.
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Court’s approach, however, ignores the historical context of
Reconstruction and the important differences between the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments.
Racial bloc voting was not a taboo that went unmentioned by the
Reconstruction Framers. Rather, it was a key reason motivating the
Fifteenth Amendment’s passage and ratification. And because racially
polarized voting is a prerequisite to a vote dilution claim,
reconstructing racially polarized voting moves those claims far closer
to the heart of the Reconstruction Amendments and bolsters the
constitutionality of the Gingles factors and Section 2. This historical
intervention also reorients voting rights doctrine toward the Fifteenth
Amendment and away from the colorblind concerns that have
animated equal-protection and voting-rights jurisprudence for the past
few decades.

